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On November 4, 1980, 53 percent of the American elec¬ 
torate who chose to vote in that year's presidential election 
voted for Ronald Reagan. Reagan subsequently received 489 
electoral votes over Jimmy Carter's 49. ^ Many political ob¬ 
servers accordingly, pronounced the New Dealism and the Great 
Society officially dead. They further predicted a move to the 
right by a substantial segment of the American electorate. The 
public, they said, was weary of liberal programs which had been 
evolving for the last forty years. 
The objectives of this research endeavor are sixfold: 
to determine whether those on the right today are at variance 
with those of twenty years ago; to identify and determine the 
political endurance of certain personalities of that phenomenon 
which has been coined "new right"; to detect whether the United 
^"Zillah Eisenstein in an article entitled "Anti¬ 
feminism in the politics and elections of 1980" warns that 
Reagan hardly received a mandate. Of the 53 percent of the 
American electorate who voted in the election, Reagan received 
27 percent-which was the lowest percentage of actual votes in 
recent history. It tied with the 27 percent which Carter re¬ 
ceived in 1976, but was much lower than the 38 percent which 
Lyndon Johnson received in 1964, for instance. From Feminist 
Studies (Summer 1981), Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 187-205. 
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States' citizenry have made a permanent move to the right; to 
unravel the specific role which the Republican Party has 
played in advancing the philosophies of the New Right; to dis¬ 
cover the role which the defection of many former liberals 
has played in enhancing the power and influence of the New 
Right; and finally, to determine whether there is a common 
ideology of the New Right. 
The mid 1960's was chosen as a starting point for this 
research because it seemed to herald an era in American his¬ 
tory when liberalism was at its apex. The President as well 
as key Congressional members were promising an end to the 
poverty and discriminating practices which had so long plagued 
the nation. Civil Rights leaders and Freedom Riders were in 
abundance in the South and they were both black and white. 
Twenty years later, however, most of the promises of the 1960s 
remained unfulfilled. This paper will attempt to reveal why 
the promises remain unfulfilled. 
The numerous statements made by many of the self- 
proclaimed spokesmen for the New Right have been superimposed 
with the statements of the more traditional members of the 
right as well as those made by Republicans. The dialectic 
appears initially to be hauntingly similar in most cases. 
Several key assumptions have therefore been made using these 
initial comparisons. Among these assumptions are (1) the New 
Right and its membership are both different from and similar 
to the membership of the right twenty years ago (this assump¬ 
tion necessarily includes distinctive racial as well as class 
3 
characteristics); (2) the New Right has become far more prag¬ 
matic in its politics and is very concerned with winning 
elections and assuming positions of power; (3) the United 
States was created out of a conservative philosophy; (4) the 
Republican Party is so undergirded with a conservative tradi¬ 
tion that its philosophy is naturally compatible with the 
philosophy of the New Right; and (5) those personalities who 
have been labeled neoconservatives have played an important 
role in shaping the philosophies and programs of the New 
Right. 
This study will scrutinize many of the original trea¬ 
tise of those on the New Right as well as monographs about 
some of the more notable personalities who have been identi- 
2 
fied by themselves and others as belonging to the New Right. 
After a basic understanding of the New Right is gleaned from 
these writings I will examine how the goals and aspirations 
are put into practice. An attempt will also be made to ex¬ 
amine the political philosophy of the New Right using C. 
Wright Mills' categories of ideology, statement of ideals, 
3 
designation of agencies, and a set of social theories. 
This thesis will be limited to an examination of a 
representative sampling of personalities on the intellectual 
2 
These personalities range from Jesse Helms, to Jerry 
Falwell, to Irvin Kristol, to Thomas Sowell. 
^Mills used these categories in the opening chapter 
of his book The Marxists, "Ideals and Ideology" (New York: 
Dell Publishing Co. , Inc., 1962), pp. 9-29. 
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right, political action committees, as well as personalities 
within these committees. The second part of this chapter will 
offer some key definitions as well as a review of related lite¬ 
rature. The second chapter will trace the historical begin¬ 
nings of liberal programs from the New Deal, then to Great 
Society programs, up to Jimmy Carter's defeat in his bid for 
re-election to the presidency. His defeat will be observed in 
terms of an ultimate conservative response to liberal programs, 
because it appears that Jimmy Carter's presidency marked a 
demarcation line where conservatives began to perceive their 
strength and began flexing their muscles politically. 
Chapter three examines the coalitions and personali¬ 
ties which comprise the New Right. Single-interest considera¬ 
tions many times have been enough to propel a group or an indi¬ 
vidual into the rank of spokesman on some specific issue. 
These coalitions will be examined in terms of political expe¬ 
diency. The fourth chapter examines the move of former libe- 
rals-many of whom admitted to being pro-socialist and pro- 
Marxist-to the right after they had become disillusioned with 
programs which in many cases they had been instrumental in 
creating. These men and women have also been instrumental in 
creating and formulating policies for many of the newly legi¬ 
timized political conservatives. 
Chapter five will examine the position taken by Black 
neoconservatives. These Blacks will be examined with an eye 
towards determining why they would choose to be identified 
with a segment of the population who three decades ago were 
5 
acknowledged to be some of the most blatantly racist people 
in the United States. Additionally, this chapter will zero 
in on the racial attitudes of those on the New Right as well 
as looking specifically at some of President Reagan's proposed 
social program cutbacks which would seem to directly affect 
many Black Americans. This discussion will necessarily have 
to include brief discussions on Reaganism, Reaganomics, and 
New Federalism. 
Lastly, some conclusions will be offered both as to 
the power of the New Right as well as its future. Both the 
elections (Presidential and Congressional) of 1980 as well as 
the strength of conservative coalitions geared to attracting 
the disillusioned masses will be examined in formulating these 
conslusions. 
While it is virtually impossible to ever come to the 
end of any description, one can always attempt to examine those 
impressions which might turn out to be temporary in nature. 
Stuart Hampshire recognized this possibility when he stated in 
Thought and Action that there are no limits to reality and a 
description of reality is virtually and essentially inexhaust- 
4 
ible. In light of this almost overwhelming limitation, the 
purpose of this thesis will be to link as many of the groups 
and personalities together who have been identified with the 
New Right in a systematic, organized fashion instead of the 
somewhat eclectic way that has been observed in previous works 
^Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1959), p. 21. 
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by other authors. The personalities and groups will be ana¬ 
lyzed in terms of being components of a well coordinated 
larger system. 
Finally, this researcher cannot and does not claim 
total detachment. C. Wright Mills stated in his Introduction 
to The Marxist that: 
... I do not claim to be detached. No political 
philosopher can be detached; he can only pretend 
to be. And I do write this book in some part as 
a political philosopher, which only means: as 
one who is seeking, with his readers, political 
orientation. Accordingly, I will try to be ex¬ 
plicit about my own political and moral judg¬ 
ments . ^ 
This researcher can only promise the same honesty regarding 
any personal biases present in this research. 
Definitions and Review of Related Literature 
If politics is understood to be a warfare of ideas,^ 
then understanding ideology is a very important prerequisite 
in understanding the much described conflict between libe¬ 
ralism and conservatism, both of which are very important 
concepts in the New Right movement. 
Walt Rostow defined ideology as "a set of concepts 
7 
and terms by which men interpret the world around them." 
^Mills, p. 10. 
^William T. Bluhm, Ideologies and Attitudes: Modern 
Political Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1974), p. xi. 
^"A Note on the Diffusion of Ideologies," Confluence 
(March 1953), pp. 32, 33. 
7 
Ideologies tell us what is good, what we ought to do, as well 
g 
as explain the way things are and why. Plano and Greenberg 
say that ideology is "a way of life of a people reflected in 
their political system, economic order, social goals and moral 
values." They further state that ideology is the means by 
which the basic values held by a party, a class, a group, or 
9 
an individual are articulated. Ideology thus postulates a 
desirable future social order. C. Wright Mills said that 
ideology is the public face of a political philosophy. 
For the ideology of the American Right to be under¬ 
stood properly the concepts of conservatism and liberalism 
must first be understood. One must also realize how the pro¬ 
cess of capitalism fits into the framework. Karl Marx defined 
capitalism in terms of a particular mode of production. Capi¬ 
talism thus becomes a system under which labour-power is a 
commodity that is bought and sold just as any other commodity. 
Capitalism is distinguished by its division of society into 
classes: A small dominant class of owners on the one hand and 
a much larger propertyless class whose only source of liveli¬ 
hood is the selling of their labour-power. Capitalism might 
therefore be defined as an economic system based on private 
ownership of the means of production and a supply-demand 
g 
Bluhm, p. 4. 
9 
Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American 
Political Dictionary, 5th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1979), p. 10. 
10 Mills, p. 17. 
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market economy.'*''*' The contradiction occurs between capitalist 
accumulation and the means by which the goal of accumulation 
is pursued. While production increases, consumption might 
very well contract. 
Nineteenth century American capitalism came under fire 
because a few made millions of dollars at the expense of the 
majority. The rise to economic wealth of the Rockefellers, 
Fords, and Mellons is well known. Laissez faire capitalism 
(where there is a voluntary exchange between individuals with¬ 
out interference from the government) was said to be unsuc¬ 
cessful as an economic theory because of government inter¬ 
ference. Capitalists and proponents of capitalism are parti¬ 
cularly partial to this argument. They blame government inter¬ 
vention for the periods of capitalist mistakes. The Federal 
government employed numerous tactics in a series of attempts 
to support the capitalists when they were in trouble. The 
capitalists, however, blame the Federal government, especially 
the Federal Reserve System which has as its primary goal the 
control of the money supply by the manipulation of bank re¬ 
serves . 
During the nineteenth century capitalism became the 
public policy because it dominated all other sources of 
belief regarding the formulation of public policy. Capitalism 
initially assimilated well with laissez faire but after the 
Civil War there were conflicts between capitalism and popular 
■*■'*'Plano and Greenberg, p. 3. 
9 
rule. Theodore Lowi states that capitalism died as an ideo¬ 
logy when the dialogue between United States Congressmen and 
12 members of the state assemblies became strained. While 
capitalism refused to incorporate some of the more liberal 
beliefs of twentieth century economics there was a degree of 
accommodation, even if it seemed to be at the impetus of govern¬ 
ment interventionist directives. 
By the 1930's, then, the economic theories advanced by 
John Maynard Keynes came to dominate American governmental 
13 
economic policies. Keynesian theory utilizes the machinery 
of government through fiscal and monetary policies to guide 
and direct a free enterprise economy. It prescribes govern¬ 
ment programs to alleviate problems in a nation's economy by 
stimulating the movement of savings into investments and mass 
consumer purchasing.^ 
The policies which came out of this interference by 
the government were criticized because they tended to treat 
the symptom and not the problem. The twentieth century was a 
time of great racial discrimination, for example, and the 
12 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The 
Second Republic of the United States (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Co., 1969), pp. 3-6. 
13 
The book which he wrote in 1935, General Theory of 
Employment Interest, and Money, became a must read book of 
that era. The Depression, which had escalated by the time 
the book had reached mass circulation, forced governments to 
re-think their policy of non-governmental intervention in 
fiscal matters which involved private businesses. 
14 
Plano and Greenberg, p. 295. 
10 
capitalists had a vested interest in a certain amount of dis¬ 
crimination. This discrimination would take place mainly at 
15 the place of employment, according to Victor Perlo. Perlo 
says that corporations receive a surplus value out of their 
discriminatory practices in the form of super-profits result¬ 
ing from the super-exploitation of certain workers. Firms 
prosper if these workers receive lower wages. According to 
Perlo, super-profits were $4.5 billion in 1949.16 
Monopoly capitalism is also viewed as being discrimi¬ 
natory. By the late 1940's certain capitalists had formed 
into monopolies where they had exclusive control of goods and 
services in particular markets. As proponents of laissez 
faire capitalism, they saw nothing wrong with natural mono¬ 
polies because they rarely last long. Coercive monopolies, 
on the other hand, are viewed as being the real culprit be¬ 
cause they prevent competitors from entering the market. 
By the late 1950's and early 1960's the Federal govern¬ 
ment had, despite the ambivalence of laissez faire capitalists, 
begun to play an active interventionist role as a way of at¬ 
tempting to correct the economic and social malaise of the 
country. Theodore Lowi feels that the concept of pluralism 
was the intellectual core of the new liberalism which even¬ 
tually replaced capitalism as the public policy. Modern 
^Victor Perlo, Economics of Racism U.S.A. Roots of 
Black Ineguality (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 
p. 131. 
16 
Ibid., p. 147. 
11 
government has been placed in the position of administering 
social relations and there is a whole bureaucratic network of 
interest groups which serve an important administrative func¬ 
tion. These interest groups ideally reduce competition 
within their own ranks and distribute the sources of power and 
17 
control. Since there has always been a conflict between the 
owners and those who work for the owners, however, the notion 
that pluralistic interest groups could solve the social ills 
of society began to seem utopian at best. Liberals began to 
say that the instruments of government could be used more 
effectively as a means for conscious efforts toward social 
change. 
Conservatives were generally thought to oppose this 
effort to use the government as an instrument of change. For 
example, Clinton Rossiter in Conservatism in America defined 
conservatism as a "commitment to a discriminating defense of 
18 
the social order against change and reform." If one of the 
characteristics of the personalities on the right can be said 
to be conservative, then it becomes apparent that the paradigm 
of non-government interference and an adherence to laissez 
faire capitalism is interchangeable. 
Irving Louis Horowitz gives a functionalist approach 
to conservatism in Ideology and Utopia in the U.S. 1956-1976. 
^^Lowi, pp. 23, 24, 30. 
18 Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: 
Knopf, 1955), pp. 12-15. 
12 
He sees conservatism as a minimization of state authority 
19 and the maximization of individual opportunity and autonomy. 
Horowitz additionally states that the conservative move grew 
out of practical politics in an effort to maintain the status 
quo. Horowitz states that conservatism is reflected in the 
United States Constitution in many forms, from the division of 
the government into three branches to the determination of who 
20 voted and how that determination was reached. 
Edmund Burke, born in 1729 in Dublin, is considered 
21 by some to be the greatest modern conservative thinker. His 
Reflections on the Revolution in France is a definitive con¬ 
servative statement. Burke was passionately in favor of main¬ 
taining the established order of things. He was very suspi¬ 
cious of innovators and change. Men, according to Burke's 
thesis, have equal rights but not to equal things. His 
thesis was based on religious beliefs and he thus saw politics 
as a mere extension of religion as well as an exercise in 
morals. Burke saw the stirrings of the demon just under the 
skin of modern man and he did not acknowledge a "natural 
22 right" of man. He felt that a proper majority could only be 
drawn from a body of people qualified by tradition, station, 
19 Irving Louis Horowitz, Ideology and Utopia in the 
United States 1956-1976 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1977), p. 136. 
20Ibid., pp. 133-134. 
21 
Russell Kirk, for instance, in The Conservative Mind: 
From Burke to Santayana (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 
3-4 . 
22Ibid., pp. 6, 15, 17, 35. 
13 
education, property, and moral principles. In Britain he 
23 
had narrowed this number to a mere 4,000 men. Burke's 
notions on conservatism are still being used as a defense and 
clarification of conservatism. 
Conservatism, of course, presupposes that there is 
something worth conserving. There exists in conservatism an 
element of elitism. There has to be some justification for 
the existence of a society involving a ruling class as well 
as a ruled class. Conservatism provides that justification. 
Burke's stance was, after all, a reaction to the French Revo¬ 
lution just as Henry Adam's was a reaction to the expansion 
of American industry.^ 
While Britain has remained almost consistently con- 
25 
servative, the United States has gone through periods of not 
"^Ibid. , p. 52. 
2 4 
Horowitz, pp. 149-150. 
25 While Britain admittedly has had long held birth¬ 
right and inheritance privileges for a certain class of 
people, it has also had its share of dissidents. For in¬ 
stance, the execution of Charles I in 1649 occurred because 
he was an uncompromising tyrant who ruled according to his 
own design instead of for the rights and liberities of the 
people. As limited as the power of Parliament was, he chose 
to maintain the power of the Crown. Revolutionaries who pre¬ 
sumably spoke for the masses claimed some credit for his 
death. Ultimately, of course, a moderate conservative path 
was chosen instead of a radical one. The monarchy in England 
obviously wanted no part of a sharing of power, but it should 
be remembered that in the late 1680's William and Mary 
signed the Bill of Rights which sought to place certain re¬ 
strictions on the crown. This in no way suggests that a 
radical ideology was developing. Quite the contrary-it was 
not. It does suggest, however, that Britain has not always 
been conservative, because there were incidences of those 
who wanted change to occur, even if only to elevate them¬ 
selves into power. The English monarchy has also had its 
14 
only liberalism but also something close to radicalism, ac- 
2 6 
cording to Russell Kirk. Because conservatives had diffi¬ 
culty convincing the public that they acted according to some 
intelligent system of thought the electorate invariably always 
27 
invited the liberals back. Lowi sees a connection between 
ninteenth century liberalism and liberal economics and the rise 
and fall of capitalist public policy. 
He states that a liberal ideology started during the 
Depression era when the assumption was that the instruments 
of government could be used to help solve some of the economic 
woes of the time. The functions of the national government 
beginning with the New Deal became regulation and distribu- 
2 8 
tion. Lowi says this was the period of the Second Republic 
in the United States and was the period when the state was 
placed into permanent receivership. This state of receivership 
assured that any institution large enough to be a significant 
29 
factor in the community could have its stability underwritten. 
The government would underwrite the programs as well as accept 
opponents, such as John Locke, who opposed the power of kings 
but rationalized on matters relating to slavery and property 
rights. Also, John Stuart Mill did not support the monarchy 
but felt the individual should be sovereign. Mills later 
changed his position as he began to fear a society dominated 
by the masses. As the condition of the masses became more 
widely discussed as a result of industrialization, Marxian and 
other theories were advocated. 
26Kirk, p. 418. 
2 8 See Appendix B. 
79 
Lowi, pp. 279-280. 
15 
most of the risks. The government could also manipulate the 
economy by manipulating the environment of conduct. 
C. Wright Mills wrote in The Marxists that Karl Marx 
remains the thinker who has articulated most clearly the 
ideas of liberalism. Liberalism in capitalist countries, ac¬ 
cording to Mills, has taken the form of social democracy which 
does not really go far enough in attempting to solve the 
existing problems. Additionally, on a worldwide scale libe¬ 
ralism has been transformed into conservativism because of the 
capitalist trappings. United States liberalism, he wrote, 
has lost its moral content and has become filled with empty 
rhetoric by becoming merely an administrative arm of govern- 
. 30 ment. 
Perhaps the most important difference between libe¬ 
rals and conservatives has been the interests with which they 
have been identified. Under a pluralist notion groups have 
input; bargaining then becomes a self-corrective device. The 
pluralist notion, however, depends on an idealized concept 
of the group. Theodore Lowi believes that interest group 
liberalism has certain conservative tendencies, including 
the weakening of popular control, a supportiveness of privi- 
ledge, as well as a fierce resistance to change. Lowi looks 
at the liberal notion of pluralism as he observed it in the 
last twenty-five or thirty years in the United States and 
30 
Mills, pp. 12-21. 
16 
concludes that governmental jurisdiction became selective as 
American cities specialized in the care of those with the 
greatest need of attention. As these cities incorporated 
more and more needy people, wealthier and more successful 
residents felt left out. In many respects the career bureau¬ 
crat became the new boss. Modern mayors became weak because 
they did not have the loyalty of the bureau chiefs. Many of 
the more important agencies (Board of Education, Welfare, 
Health, Housing, and Transportation) no longer were under 
mayoral jurisdiction.3* 
Lowi goes further in his analysis by stating that the 
1961 New York City mayoral election was the most significant 
election in modern urban history because it ushered in a 
bureaucratic state. The bureaucrats began to gain more and 
more power and this power sometimes seemed indistinguishable 
from the power of politicians. As political systems became 
decentralized administrative officers recognized the full 
potential of their authority. Conversely, as non-elected 
officials, bureaucrats were not obliged to be responsive to 
the electorate as were the elected representatives of the 
people. Lowi said that Mayor Wagner dealt with the civil 
service organizations just as the old political bosses dealt 
with the party machine. The result was increased expendi- 
32 
tures which New York City to this day is attempting to cope. 
31Lowi, pp. 51, 58, 60, 68, 125, 178-179. 
3^Ibid., pp. 182-183. 
17 
The solution which New York City and other fiscally poor 
cities chose was more financial assistance from the federal 
government. 
As more and more people who were educated in the 
liberal tradition began working within the inner structures 
of the liberal administrative offices-state, local, and 
national-many of them became increasingly disillusioned with 
the lack of progress made via the social assistance programs 
and joined the ranks of the conservatives. These people are 
labeled neoconservatives, to distinguish not only their intel¬ 
lectual leanings but also their defection from the ranks of 
the liberals. Peter Steinfels in 1979 wrote a special piece 
for Esquire magazine in which he said that neoconservatism is 
33 
nothing more than a political move of intellectuals. 
Neoconservatives have always been fiercely attached 
to political and cultural moderation and committed to stabi¬ 
lity. Not surprisingly, they have also been pessimistic about 
34 
the possibilities for long-range change. Neoconservatives 
are the flip side of the liberal coin: they are the people 
who agree that changes in society are necessary but who feel 
the changes must occur moderately. When the changes which 
were beginning to occur in twentieth century America were 
proving to be ineffective neoconservatives became "refugees 
from the Left," as they were called in a Newsweek article. 
3 3 
Peter Steinfels, "The Reasonable Right," Esquire, 
February 13, 1979, p. 24. 
34 , . , 
Ibid. 
18 
One distinguishing feature about neoconservatives is that they 
are overwhelmingly people who put their thoughts into writing. 
They have become the transmitters of conservative ideas. 
Their intellectual base encompasses foundations, journals, pub¬ 
lishing houses, and research institutions. 
If one accepts Alexis de Tocqueville's statement that: 
Among all civilized peoples, the study of politics 
creates, or at least gives shape to, general ideas; 
and from those general ideas are formed the prob¬ 
lems in the midst of which politicians must struggle, 
and also the laws which they imagine they create. 
Political theories form a sort of intellectual atmos¬ 
phere breathed by both governors and governed in 
society, and both unwittingly derive from it the 
principles of their action,35 
then the importance of neoconservative intellectuals cannot 
be underestimated. They write the books and magazine articles 
and formulate public policy which controls the lives of all 
the citizens of the United States. Thus, when James Q. Wilson 
writes about crime prevention and prisons, Daniel Bell writes 
about the breakdown of authority in the culture, Nathan Glazer 
writes about the failure of affirmative action, and Irving 
3 6 
Kristol writes negatively about government regulators, they 
■^Ibid. , p. 26. 
O f. 
Wilson in Thinking About Crime; Bell in "The Cul¬ 
tural Contradictions of Capitalism," Glazer in Affirmative 
Discrimination; Kristol in Two Cheers for Capitalism. Ac¬ 
cording to my definition of neoconservative all of the above 
people would be classified as such because at one time in 
their professional career they recognized the inequalities of 
society and recognized that some changes should occur, but 
when the changes went contrary to their own particular philo¬ 
sophy (which was inherently conservative) their conservative 
loyalities became evident. 
19 
must all be given more than cursory thought. Many of these 
intellectuals do not find it hard at all to defend the con¬ 
cept of capitalism in one of the most powerful capitalist 
nations in the world. 
While this writer acknowledges the fact that labels 
are more often than not an inadequate means of communicating 
ideologies, they do seem to provide the convenience of link¬ 
ing like-minded people so as to study what they have in com¬ 
mon in order to assess their role in a more analytical manner. 
So it is with this attempt to identify and analyze the ideology 
of the New Right. While admittedly it crosses party lines, 
class lines, and racial lines, there is (or seems to be) a 
common thread of similarity: they are conservative in the 
very traditional sense while at the same time being politi¬ 
cally sophisticated. They realize the strength they have in 
numbers and refuse to be identified with one political party 
permanently for fear that their most salient weapon might be¬ 
come diluted. 
The New Right is a label which is utilized to identify 
a very old trend in the political thought of the country. In 
this society politics rests on the ability to build coali- 
37 
tions. The New Right capitalizes on the discontent of many 
citizens regarding big government and big spending. The de¬ 
finition also depends on who is doing the defining. Alan 
37 
Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Emerging Coalitions in 
American Politics (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary 
Studies, 1978), p. 3. 
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Crawford in Thunder on the Right: The New Right and the 
Politics of Resentment defines the New Right as: 
... an institutionalized, disciplined, well financed 
political network that capitalizes on the passion 
behind single causes and skillfully commands the use 
of political action committees.38 
The New Right is pragmatic in the sense that it will coope¬ 
rate with groups with which it would seem to have little in 
common as far as past experiences are concerned. For example, 
Black churches which form alliances with white religious 
church groups on issues such as pro-life and anti-communism, 
even though the white groups might have a history of racist 
practices in the structure of their church policy as well as 
in the community in which they live. 
A common feature of the New Right is its negativism; 
it seems to be against far more issues than it is for. As 
Richard Viguerie was guoted as saying: 
We are no longer working to preserve the status 
guo. We are radicals working to overthrow the 
power structure of this country. We organize 
discontent and must prove our ability to get 
revenge on people who are against us.39 
40 
Coalition building is the primary method of gaining 
3 8 
Alan Crawford, Thunder on the Right; The New Right 
and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1980), as taken from Milton Ellerin and Alisa H. Kesten, 
"New Right: An Emerging Force on the Political Scene", 
U.S.A. Today, March 1981, p. 15. 
Coalition building is defined as the process of 
constructing majorities from the broad sentiments and inter¬ 
ests that can be found to bridge the narrower needs and hopes 
of separate individuals and communities. From Lipset, pp. 
3-4. 
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recruits for those who are politically active on the right. 
Coalitions will thus be a very important component of this 
analysis of the New Right. This analysis will be a critical 
one in the sense that Charles Kadushin meant, that is, it 
41 will attempt to explicate an underlying structure. Much of 
what has been previously written about the New Right has been 
written by its proponents so there is an element of justifica¬ 
tion in these writings. This often nullifies the possibility 
of a truly critical examination. 
The assumptions of this writer will be much different 
from those contained in many of the books and articles which 
have been written so far about the New Right. Many of the 
assumptions which have been currently used in shaping the 
direction of many of those in the American political science 
discipline are not readily acceptable by this writer. These 
would include such notions as a belief in the pluralist 
notion, the belief that the capitalist system is one of the 
more efficient economic systems, and the belief that voting 
is a sign of the privilege of political participation. 
Many of the motives of those who are identified with 
the New Right will be questioned. For instance, is Jesse 
Helms any less a racist now than he was twenty years ago? 
How much of Reaganism as manifested in the 1980's was merely 
rhetoric used to attract the votes of the New Right? What 
are the reasons that Black citizens such as Ralph Abernathy, 
^Charles Kadushin, The American Intellectual Elite 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), p. 3. 
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Thomas Sowell, and J. A. Y, Parker have that would rational¬ 
ize their support for conservative ideas in general and Ronald 
Reagan's presidency specifically? Are the beliefs of Black and 
white conservatives shaped by ideologically similar experiences? 
Do neoconservatives naturally enjoy being associated with 
power and powerful people? It is more than a coincidence that 
many of the people identified with the New Right are Republicans 
or have been brought up in the ranks of the Republican Party? 
Finally, do religious leaders like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robert¬ 
son see no conflict between church and state when they expouse 
their conservative philosophy and political views to their tele¬ 
vision audiences? 
Lerone Bennett in The Challenge of Blackness attempted 
to define the role of Black artists. His definition seems to 
be interchangeable with any Black critic involved in research 
which will eventually reach the eyes and ears of other Black 
people. He wrote: 
... an artist in the situation of a Black (situation 
of oppression and injustice) in a segregated society 
which questions the humanity of all Blacks whether 
they peel potatoes or write poems, has special re¬ 
sponsibilities and special tasks ... to break through 
to authenticity as a person to hack away through 
the dense underground of myths ... to come to terms 
with himself and his history, to accept himself, to 
accept the color of his skin and accept the ambiguity 
and tension of his experience; to see with his own 
eyes and to hear with his own ears and to find new 
language and new forms to express what he sees and 
hears, to see the Black experience within a wider 
context, to relate that experience to the great 
human theme of liberation and oppression, struggle 
and growth, victory and defeat, to express himself 
directly, openly, honestly, and if necessary, bru¬ 
tally without a prior check with the white Other; to 
emancipate himself from the limitation of the white 
23 
cultural structure and the subtle tyranny of white 
audiences.42 
The New Right will thus be examined with a bent on 
first illustrating that it is not an anomaly but a natural 
progression of other conservative/rightist movements in twen¬ 
tieth century United States. Secondly, the New Right will be 
seen as possessing a certain amount of racism which has served 
as a further unifying force. I would agree with David Edgar 
when he wrote in Race and Class that there is a hidden agenda 
of the new American right and that hidden agenda is racism. 
Edgar writes that the desire to roll back the gains of the 
Black movement since the 1960's remain a central determinant 
43 of the style and political practice of the New Right. The 
reactions started with anti-busing, then desegregation, anti¬ 
affirmative action and expanded from there. Many of the intel¬ 
lectual members of the neoconservatives feel duty bound to 
44 
concentrate their literary efforts along racial lines. 
Since those who are identified with the New Right are 
so pragmatic and so concerned with forming coalitions in 
42 
Lerone Bennett, Jr., The Challenge of Blackness 
(Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 191- 
192. 
43 David Edgar, "Reagan's Hidden Agenda: Racism and 
the New American Right," Race and Class: A Journal for Black 
and Third World Liberation, Volume XXII, No. 3 (Winter 1981), 
p. 226. 
44 Daniel P. Moynihan, with his Moynihan Report and 
''Benign Neglect," memorandum; Nathan Glazer and his Ethnicity 
and Beyond the Melting Pot; Norman Podhertz and his "My 
Negro Problem-and Ours", are just a few illustrations. 
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order to win elections the word "race" is hardly ever men¬ 
tioned. Code words come into use and such phrases as "lower 
taxes," which means cut out welfare programs which have come 
to have a Black face, "law and order," which is used to per¬ 
petuate the notion that Blacks have a criminal mentality as 
well as the need to stifle that mentality, and "state's 
rights," which many Southern states understand to mean a 
license to continue the maltreatment of its Black citizens, 
are much in evidence. 
The New Right, then, will be analyzed in two ways: 
one, as a really new conservative move in the United States 
and two, as a continuation of the conservatism which this coun¬ 
try was founded upon. I will attempt to reveal both the simi¬ 
larities as well as the distinctive differences, and all of 
the definitions and concepts discussed in this chapter will be 
utilized in drawing such distinctions. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS 
In examining the historical beginnings of the New 
Right movement, coalition building is a very important aspect 
of this conservative formation. In the late nineteenth cen¬ 
tury coalitions in the United States were more or less stable. 
Fewer than 5 percent of the voters changed their party between 
elections or split their tickets to vote for candidates of 
different parties.^ By the late 1930's American politics had 
formed along liberal-conservative lines. The liberals were 
thought to emphasize the faults of modernization and the need 
for federal remedies. The conservatives seemed to argue that 
the ideals of efficiency and personal achievements were being 
2 
undermined by the New Deal anti-business stance. 
The facts seem to confirm that President Hoover ini¬ 
tially felt the federal government's role during the Depres- 
3 
sion was merely to encourage private relief agencies. Presi¬ 
dent Hoover responded to the issue of poverty as past national 
governments had, out of a fear of the potential violent nature 
^Lipset, p. 22. 
^Ibid., p. 34. 
^Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating 
the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1971), p. 50. 
25 
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of the poor. During the worst times of the Depression there 
were demonstrations and anti-eviction groups. Hoover's re¬ 
sponse was to initially aid the poor through local businesses 
4 
so as to leave the economic structure intact. He later, of 
course, was forced to employ federal measures. 
Franklin Roosevelt criticized Hoover for doing too 
much on a national level for the poor but when he was inau¬ 
gurated in 1933 things had reached such a crisis stage that 
he set plans in motion to do even more. The marches, riots, 
arrests, and general unrest that the poor exhibited probably 
had a great influence on the complete turnabout of his posi¬ 
tion concerning aid.^ It was in this atmosphere that Franklin 
Roosevelt signed The Emergency Banking Act, The Economy Act, 
The Civilian Conservation Corps bill, the Homeowner's Act, 
as well as The Farm Credit Act. By the end of 1934 clearly 
one-sixth of the population (twenty million people) were on 
some form of relief. 
It must be remembered that the relief programs under 
the New Deal were only designed as temporary programs. They 
were not created to fight poverty in a lasting way. Roose¬ 
velt said that giving a direct handout to the poor was a 
threat to private enterprise even though private enterprises 
had proven that they could not handle the immediate problems 
^Ibid., p. 40. 
5Ibid. 
^Ibid., p. 75. 
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of the poor.^ 
The New Deal did mark a shift in two major areas: (1) 
the Federal government for the first time involved itself in 
the problems of the cities and (2) the cities realized that 
petitioning the Federal government for money was not so bad 
after all. The groundwork for federal intervention into the 
problems of the cities had thus been laid with the New Deal 
and has been escalating since that period. 
President Kennedy by early 1963 had decided to include 
some sort of anti-poverty program in his bid for re-election, 
and after his assassination newly inaugurated President Lyndon 
Johnson continued and expanded this strategy and anti-poverty 
programs were one of the first campaign promises he acted upon 
g 
when he was elected to the Presidency in 1964. There did seem 
to be a need for such programs: There was documented evidence 
showing that fully 20 percent of the American people had in¬ 
comes far below the government guideline of $3,000 a year for 
9 
a family of four. 
Dennis Judd in The Politics of American Cities and 
Frances Piven and Richard Cloward in Regulating the Poor ad¬ 
vanced the notion that President Johnson's anti-poverty 
"^Dennis R. Judd, The Politics of American Cities: Pri¬ 
vate Power and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1979), pp. 131-136. 
8 
Marc Pilisuk and Phyllis Pilisuk, How We Lost the 
War on Poverty (New Jersey: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 
1973), Introduction and Piven and Cloward, Passim. 
9 
Pilisuk, p. 37. 
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programs were created mainly to strengthen the Democratic 
Party's acceptance among inner city Blacks.Cloward and 
Piven also assert that the Democratic Party probably early 
in mid twentieth century realized the political influence 
Blacks wielded when they migrated from rural to urban set- 
4. • 11 tings. 
Blacks simultaneously tended to weaken the struggle 
of the Democratic Party. Even though the Democratic plat¬ 
forms of 1952 and 1956 were impotent regarding civil rights 
issues the North-South coalition virtually dissolved because 
of racist southern Democrats' feelings that too much was being 
done for Blacks. The Republican Party became the recipient of 
many traditionally Democratic southern votes. In 1952, Flo¬ 
rida, Virginia, Tennessee and Texas went to the Republican can¬ 
didate for President, Dwight Eisenhower. In 1956, Louisiana, 
Texas, Tennessee, Florida and Virginia also went with the 
Republican Presidential candidate. Some political theorists 
say that the Democratic Party intentionally created a bloc of 
supporters when it sanctioned the various War on Poverty pro- 
12 
grams. 
Class lines loomed into importance between 1936 and 
1976. The Communist Party U.S.A. had already used the devi- 
sive economic nature of the late 1920's and early 1930's to 
recruit dissident workers into their organization. The 
lOjudd, p. 251 and Piven and Cloward, p. 252. 
Hlbid. 
12 Piven and Cloward, pp. 252-253. 
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Depression years illustrated more than ever the distinction 
between the haves and the have-nots. While the Vanderbilts, 
Rockefellers, and Fords were becoming millionaires because of 
laissez faire captialism on one hand, whole segments of the 
American population were barely able to sustain a minimum stan- 
13 
dard of living on the other. Other liberal organizations, 
such as the American Federation of Labor, came to the aid of 
workers and began to attempt to draw lines of clear cut dis¬ 
tinctions between those who owned the means of production and 
those who merely sold their labour power. 
As the repercussions from the Depression began to sub¬ 
side, class distinctions became even more particularized. Erik 
Olin Wright in Class, Crisis and the State wrote that classes 
are structurally determined not only at the economic level, but 
at the political and ideological levels as well. As the govern¬ 
ment became more and more involved in programs designed to help 
the have-nots, bureaucratization set in and a "new" petty bour¬ 
geoisie evolved. Included among this group were technicians, 
14 
supervisors, civil servants, and white collar employees. 
Nicos Poulantzas asserted in Classes in Contemporary 
Capitalism that unlike other workers who were engaged in 
13 Many books deal with this period in American history; 
among them the Piven and Cloward book Regulating the Poor, as 
well as a book entitled In Their Own Words: A History of the 
American Negro, edited by Milton Meltzer (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Company, 1967). The book is the third in a series and 
uses letters, interviews, affidavits and eyewitness accounts. 
14 
Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis, and the State 
(London: Verso, 1979), pp. 287-294. 
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productive activity, the new petty bourgeoisie are unproduc¬ 
tive labourers because they do not produce a surplus value, 
i.e., use values that increase material wealth. The petty 
bourgeoisie ideology, according to Poulantzas, has three core 
elements which would be detrimental to the masses of workers: 
(1) reformism, where the problems of capitalism are seen as 
solvable through institutional reform rather than revolu¬ 
tionary change (2) individualism, where proletarianization is 
feared and upward mobility is the goal and (3) power fetishism 
where the state is seen as an inherently neutral force whose 
role is that of arbitrator.^ 
Max Weber as early as 1917 analyzed bureaucratization. 
He wrote in Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed 
Germany that with the development of capitalism and the in¬ 
creasing complexity of society the need for rational adminis¬ 
tration expands both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a 
result, he wrote, both public and private organizations tend 
to become more bureaucratized. As bureaucratization increases 
the power of bureaucrats also tends to increase, both with re¬ 
spect to non-bureaucratic organizations as well as the non- 
16 
bureaucratic elements of bureaucracy. 
Victor Perlo discusses a different type of exploita¬ 
tion of the worker in The Economics of Racism, U.S.A. He does 
^Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism 
(London: New Left Books, 1975), as critiqued by Wright in his 
book. 
1 f) 
Max Weber, Parliament and Government in a Recon¬ 
structed Germany, as quoted from Wright, pp. 184-185. 
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not blame the petty bourgeoisie (which he calls the middle 
class) as much as he does those in control of the corporate 
economy. He states that the real economic discrimination 
takes place mainly at the place of employment and control 
of employment is exclusively in the hands of the capita- 
17 
lists. A capitalist as defined by Perlo in 1975 was one 
who had at least $1 million in assets and a yearly income of 
1 R 
$100,000.00. 
The dichotomy between the haves and the have-nots is 
thus an evolutionary one. The haves tended to gravitate to¬ 
ward one political party and ideology while the have-nots 
pledged their allegiance to another. The conflict eventually 
became evident through the Democratic and Republican parties. 
During the thirty-six year period between 1936 and 1972 the 
Democrats won six presidential elections while the Republicans 
won four. Democratic strength, however, was largely neutra- 
19 
lized by conservative Republican control of Congress. For 
example, from 1938 to 1964 the conservative coalition con- 
20 
trolled ten key Congressional committees. 
The state legislatures were the chief bastion of the 
conservative element and the suburbs were the beneficiary of 
conservative considerations while the inner cities became more 
■*"^Perlo, p. 131. 
■^Ibid. , p. 18 . 




and more dilapidated. During this same period, it must be 
remembered, coalitions were in their formative stages. Eve¬ 
rett Carll Ladd, Jr., in an article included in Lipset's book 
entitled "The Shifting Party Coalitions 1932 to 1976" wrote 
that the Democratic Party began to consist of the working 
class, organized labor, Catholics, and most of the South. The 
Republican Party, he stated, consisted of business, the middle 
21 
class, and (white) Protestants. 
The Republican Party was an important component in the 
coalition building that was occurring. Founded in 1854, it 
was not a single-issue party even then, although one of its 
22 
chief concerns at the time was the slavery issue. The Repub¬ 
lican Party early on appealed to business and commercial inte¬ 
rests. It believed in limited federal involvement of the free 
enterprise system. The Republicans occupied the White House 
for fifty-six of the seventy-two years between 1860 and 1932. 
The Republicans suffered during the Depression years, as can 
be witnessed by the 1928 presidential election when Herbert 
Hoover carried forty states and comparing that election to the 
next one held in 1932 when Alfred Landon carried only two 
. . 23 states. 
The early philosophy of the Republican Party was three- 
21 
Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., "The Shifting Party Coali¬ 
tions 1932 to 1976," as contained in Lipset, pp. 83-91. 
22 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., National Party Conven¬ 




fold: strict interpretation of the Constitution, states' 
rights, and limited spending by the Federal government. Mack 
C. Shelley, II, Assistant Professor of Political Science and 
Statistics at Iowa State University, wrote a paper in which he 
attempted to determine a relationship between the conservative 
coalition in the United States Congress (which he defined as 
those congressional Republicans and southern Democrats who 
adopted the same roll call position and who vote together 
against roll call positions taken by the majority of non- 
24 
Southern Democrats) and the President from 1953 to 1978. He 
expected to find higher rates of agreement among the conserva¬ 
tives coalition and the Republican Presidents than among that 
coalition and Democratic Presidents. He also proposed that the 
conservative coalition could be interpreted as either a defen¬ 
sive alliance designed to thwart programmatically liberal poli¬ 
cies emanating from members of Congress or the White House when 
in Democratic hands or alternatively as a predominantly aggre- 
sive policy bloc that is given extra impetus by the presence of 
a Republican administration. He found that Democratic Presi¬ 
dents do more harm than good to the conservative coalition's pro¬ 
grammatic position in the House and Senate, while Republican 
25 
Presidents had an opposite effect. 
Allen Hunter suggests that many of the key personali¬ 
ties in the New Right developed either in the Old (or 
^^Mack C. Shelley, II, "The Conservative Coalition 
and the President, 1953-1978," Occasional Paper, Iowa State 
University, Volume II, No. 1, 1980, pp. 2-3. 
^Ibid. , pp . 4 , 20 . 
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traditional) American right or in the Republican Party. 
John R. Coyne, Jr., who was a speech writer for Richard 
Nixon, Spiro Agnew and Gerald Ford, feels that: 
... conservatism, despite the sometimes intense 
efforts of its spokesmen to escape, still re¬ 
mains wedded to Republicanism, and there is no 
divorce in sight.2' 
While events at early Republican conventions seemed relatively 
28 
progressive, contemporary Republicans take a decidedly less 
progressive stance on most of today's popular issues. 
The defeat of George McGovern in 1972 seemed to illus¬ 
trate that the American electorate would no longer support 
policies of liberalism. The coalitions which had been pre¬ 
viously supportive of the Democratic Party began to lessen. 
The South pulled away largely because of the issue of civil 
rights and it was becoming angry with the attitude of the so- 
called Eastern establishment for its sometimes superior and 
condescending actions. The South felt that the Eastern estab¬ 
lishment was attempting to push remedies down its throat re¬ 
garding the civil rights situation without first considering 
the uniqueness of the South's position. According to William 
Schneider the period between 1964 and 1972 saw the emergence of 
Allen Hunter, "In the Wings: New Right Ideology and 
Organization." Radical America. Volumes 1 and 2 (Spring 1981), 
2, p. 117. 
27 
John R. Coyne, Jr., Fall in the Cheer (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1979), p. 127. 
2 8 For instance, Frederick Douglass in 1888 was the 
first Black to receive a vote in a Presidential balloting; in 
1900 there was a woman delegate, and in 1920 women seemed to 
attend the convention in significant numbers. 
35 
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a predominantly middle class ideology. Barry Goldwater in 
1964 received most of his support from those in the upper 
middle class and these people continue to exert great pressure 
from within both the Republican and Democratic parties. The 
Republican Party was also able to attract many former conser¬ 
vative Democrats, among them Ronald Reagan, John Connally, 
Strom Thurmond and Richard Schweiker. 
The election of Richard Nixon to the Presidency in 1968 
(close as it was) seemed to be an affirmation by conservatives 
that they were fed up with government intervention into their 
private lives. Nixon promised a return to states' rights as 
well as a stop to the methodology of using the resources of 
the Federal government to solve all of the ills of society. 
These conservatives did not, however, bargain for the political 
blunders of Nixon. Republican Congressman Paul N. McCloskey 
said that Nixon's was an immoral and untruthful administration. 
He further stated that Nixon lied about Vietnam, used the Jus¬ 
tice Department for political reasons, and slowed down civil 
rights enforcement.^ Richard Nixon's biggest blunder was of 
course the Watergate episode, and it caused such a great back¬ 
lash that some thought the conservatives would have to relin¬ 
quish the political reins completely. 
Jimmy Carter won his bid for the Presidency in 1976 
29 
Lipset, p. 214. 
^Paul N. McCloskey, Truth and Untruth: Political 
Deceit in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 
11. 
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because he was a skillful politician. He took the liberal 
left politics of the 1960's and 1970's and combined it with a 
conservative counteraction. He synthesized the two into one 
that was acceptable to both extremes. He was able to capture 
the conservatives because he spoke of the qualities near and 
dear to their hearts-goodness, decency, morality, the family, 
and above all, love of God. Many conservatives thought that 
Jimmy Carter would be very conservative because (1) he was a 
Christian and should therefore have been anti-Communist, (2) 
he believed in an after-life and would not attempt to built a 
perfect society here on earth, (3) he should have been a strong 
proponent of national defense since he was a graduate of Anna¬ 
polis, and (4) he should have had conservative fiscal policies 
31 
since he was a successful businessman. Carter did not live 
up to all of these expectations, however. He very shrewdly used 
his position as a political outsider to present himself as a 
competent administrator who could balance the budget as well as 
bring runaway government under control. He cited several ex¬ 
amples of what he had done in Georgia as Governor and many of 
32 
these proved to be little more than exaggerations. 
^Coyne, p. 125. 
3 2 Carter claimed to have eliminated 2100 unnecessary 
state jobs, but according to the June 12, 1978 issue of Inquiry, 
these jobs only existed on paper. Carter also claimed to have 
left the Georgia state budget with a $116 million surplus but 
he neglected to mention that there was a $103 million surplus 
when he took office. He claimed to have eliminated 278 of 
the 300 Georgia state agencies, but again, many of those agen¬ 
cies existed either only on paper or did not receive state 
funds anyway. 
37 
In May 1977 Carter set up The President's Reorganiza¬ 
tion Project in the Office of Management and Budget. This 
project created the Department of Energy, which was criticized 
for its wastefulness almost from the beginning. In March of 
1978 Carter called for a reform of the U.S. Civil Service Com¬ 
mission. The plan was drafted, however, by federal employees 
from different agencies and lacked the toughness it could have 
possibly had if drafted by outsiders. A part of the plan in¬ 
cluded the creation of a Merit Protection Board which was 
charged with protecting the rights of government employees. 
It seems apparent that Carter used government bureaucrats to 
33 
enhance their own positions. Therefore, while Carter made 
promises to reorganize the Federal government and put a reign 
on the ever-growing bureaucratic network, he in fact created 
more bureaucratic agencies and did nothing to curtail govern¬ 
ment spending. 
While many who believed in coalition politics continued 
to express themselves through the Democratic and Republican 
parties, many others began thinking along other lines. Howard 
Phillips (who helped Richard Nixon in his attempt to dismantle 
the War on Poverty apparatus), Richard Viguerie (the fund 
raising genius), and Paul Weyrich (who founded the right wing 
think tank, The Heritage Foundation) saw the need for an alter¬ 
native method as early as 1964. These three are usually 
33 From a discussion by Marjorie Boyd, "Reorganization: 
Carter's Big Lie," Inquiry (now defunct), (June 12, 1978), pp. 
12-15. 
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acknowledged as the founders of what has come to be known as 
the New Right. The original plan of these men was the forma- 
34 
tion of a third party for a Wallace-Reagan ticket. The 
party base was originally to be the Conservative Caucus but 
this plan was abandoned and the founders chose more or less 
to try to work within the framework of the Republican Party. 
The relatively historical short life span of third parties can 
probably be credited as the reason for the demise of this 
original idea. Even while the New Right tended to support 
Republicans, they denounced strict party loyalty and refused 
35 
to support candidates simply because they were Republicans. 
Ellerin and Keston mention three premises of the New 
Right: (1) the Republican and Democratic party system have 
become ineffective, (2) the Federal government has become too 
remote from the people, and (3) a new coalition of Democrats, 
Republicans, and Independents is needed to replace the govern- 
3 6 
mental elite. The strategy is to capitalize on popular dis¬ 
content and those in the New Right have an unabiding loyalty 
to issues, which takes precedent over party loyalty. 
Closely aligned to the secular New Right is the Chris¬ 
tian Right which consists of about twelve or so Protestant 
ministers who just happen to also be national religious 
figures. They surfaced sometime during the 1974 Congressional 
^ Ellerin and Kesten, pp. 10, 11. 




elections and made their first concerted political effort in 
1976. Through organizations such as the Christian Freedom 
Foundation, the Christian Embassy, and Intercessors for America- 
all now defunct-they attempted to send Christ-centered candi¬ 
dates to Congress. In 1979 the union between secular and 
religious became solidified through the Reverends Robert Bil¬ 
lings, Jerry Falwell, and James Robinson. The union was based 
on family issues such as anti-ERA, anti-homosexuality, prayer 
37 in school, and pro-life. This is the union that led to the 
subsequent creation of the Moral Majority, which is functionally 
a lobbying and educational organization. 
There certainly seemed to be a growing conservative 
constituency. A March 1978 issue of Society published a New 
York Daily News poll which indicated that 22 percent of the New 
York City residents called themselves liberal, 32 percent pre¬ 
ferred the term moderate, and 34 percent chose the label con- 
3 8 
servative. A 1977 Gallop poll showed that 83 percent of 
those questioned were against reverse discrimination, which is 
usually interpreted as being a vote against liberal-inspired 
government programs. A New York Times-CBS Poll of the same 
year found that 58 percent of those questioned did not like 
39 
government sponsored welfare programs. These polls are 
significant because they refuted in part the notion that the 
^Ibid. , p. 13 . 
3 8 
"Conservative Trends," Society, Volume 15 March 
1978, p. 6. 
39 
Ibid., p. 8. 
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United States was on a liberal path that seemed to be the con¬ 
sensus of the majority of its citizens. 
James Kilpatrick, however, as late as April 1978 did 
not see anything remarkable about such polls. He said the 
polls were misleading for several reasons, among them the bad 
press that liberals had been receiving. Kilpatrick also felt 
there was an ideological confusion present because those who 
identified themselves as conservatives did not oppose the con¬ 
servative issues which they ideologically should have, such as 
40 
national health insurance and gun control. 
There also seems to be some support for the suggestion 
that the New Right is descended from the Ultra Right or even 
reactionary right organizations which were created as a pro¬ 
test against liberal programs initiated during the New Deal. 
Allen Hunter asserts in an article in Radical America that the 
backlash against liberalism began before the phenomenon of the 
New Right. The "new," he says, simply means a greater pragma- 
41 
tism. Those of the old school seemed to prefer to go down 
in defeat rather than risk losing their ideological purity. 
But the old rightist groups in combination with single-issue 
concerns made the New Right possible. For instance, sentiments 
against Communism, busing, abortion, the Equal Rights Amend¬ 
ments, homosexuality, and feminism had their early beginnings 
40 
"How Real is that Trend Towards Conservatism?", 
Nation's Business, Volume 66, April 1978, p. 13. 
41 
Hunter, p. 116. 
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in old line right organizations. 
The New Right also found much support in the Republican 
Party. The 1980 Republican platform called for tax rate reduc¬ 
tions, spending restraints, and regulatory reforms which would 
inject new life into the economic picture. The Republicans 
also sought to restore the family, the neighborhood, the com¬ 
munity, and the workplace as vital alternatives to federal in¬ 
tervention. The platform was also in opposition to federaliz¬ 
ing the welfare system, against federal interference in state 
ratification of ERA, pro right to life, against the Supreme 
Court's intrustion into the family structure, supportive of 
individuals' right to participate in voluntary non-denomina- 
tional prayer in schools and other public facilities, against 
forced busing to achieve arbitrary racial quotas, supportive 
of the orderly, wholesale transfer of all welfare functions to 
the states along with the tax sources to finance them, pro 
42 
death penalty, and pro right to keep and bear arms. These 
positions by the Republicans should illustrate why many of the 
single-issue groups of the New Right as well as the umbrella 
organization itself, the National Council of Political Action 
Committee, find it politically expedient to form a coalition 
with many Republicans. Many of the concerns are identical. 
Richard Viguerie said in a television interview on April 20, 
1981 that the 1980 Presidential and Congressional victories 
42 Congressional Record, "Proceedings and Debates of 
the 96th Congress," 2nd Session, 1980 Republican National 
Convention Platform, pp. 3, 4, 5-15. 
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were also conservative victories. In a similar interview 
on April 13, 1981 John 'Terry' Dolan of NCPAC said that he 
favored Reagan's programs and those in Congress that did not 
44 
do likewise should be kicked out. 
Of course the relationship between the Republicans 
and those labeled New Rightist is not a permanent one. Ini¬ 
tially the New Right was running its own candidates and com¬ 
peted with the Republicans for votes as well as financial con¬ 
tributions. The people who are considered the directors of 
the New Right are non-elected technocrats-Weyrich, Dolan, 
Phillips, and Viguerie. When agreement on certain issues are 
present the New Rightists certainly do not fail to take advan¬ 
tage of this agreement. Given the conservative leanings of 
the Republicans, however, the New Rightists will most likely 
agree with Republicans far more than they will disagree. 
The next chapter will attempt to examine specific coa¬ 
litions that are part of the New Right as well as the leading 
spokesmen of these groups. 
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A.B.C., A.B.C. Good Morning America, April 20, 1981, 
"The New Right: How Strong a Political Force?," David Hartman, 
Moderator. 
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C.B.S., C.B.S. News, April 13, 1981, "Interview 
with John 'Terry' Dolan," Walter Cronkite, Moderator. 
CHAPTER III 
PERSONALITIES/COALITIONS/GROUPS 
Coalition building in tandem with independent single¬ 
issue groups have been instrumental agents in the emergence of 
the strength of the New Right. Conservative rightist coali¬ 
tions are nothing new in twentieth century America and perhaps 
the most famous is the John Birch Society. Founded in 1958 as 
a secret (or at least semi-secret) organization, the John 
Birch Society zeroed in on communism. Its founder was Robert 
Welch and its principal organ was American Opinion. There are 
those political analysts who say the John Birch Society got its 
greatest strength from the Southern Rim; that is, California, 
Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Loui¬ 
siana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina. The Southern Rim, according to 
Kirkpatrick Sale, grew with the advent of World War II. Mi¬ 
gration to a warmer climate also had an influence in the 
Southern Rim emerging as a competitive power base. The eco¬ 
nomic revolution in the Southern Rim has emerged to encompass 
defense, aerospace, electronics, agribusiness, and oil and 
gas extraction. This revolution began to rival industries in 
the Northeast, i.e., those in Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, New Hampshire, 
43 
44 
Massachusetts. Maine, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New- 
Jersey. 1 
Powerful men in the United States political arena have 
often come from the Southern Rim, including Sam Rayburn, John 
Stennis, Sam Ervin, Carl Albert, Howard Baker, Jerry Brown, 
Lloyd Bentsen, Fred Harris, and Jimmy Carter. The Southern 
Rim in the last decade has had a tremendous impact on national 
politics. For instance, the Southern Rim accounts for 68 per- 
2 
cent of the 270 electoral votes needed to win the presidency. 
Those on the Far Right, such as the Birchers, often find their 
greatest support in the Southern Rim. It is reported that a 
rich oilman told then President Richard Nixon that: 
It is a well known fact that this Southern area 
encompasses a segment of the population that is 
more truly and typically American with most of its 
citizenry untouched by the alien philosophies that 
have found acceptance in other sections of the 
country.3 
The major rightist organizations which saw their 
greatest membership increases in the 1960's and 1970's could 
be said to have three major material bases: (1) Violence with 
racial overtones, (2) Religion, and (3) Politics. 
Kirkpatrick Sale, Power Shift: The Rise of the 
Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 5-6. 
2 
The number of electoral votes which the states in the 
Southern Rim possessed as of the 1980 elections are Calif. 
(45), Nev. (3), Ariz. (6), New Mexico (4), Oklahoma (8), 
Texas (26), Ark. (6), La. (10), Miss. (7), Tenn. (10), Ala. 
(9), Georgia (12), Fla. (17), No. Carolina (13), and So. 
Carolina (8). 
^Sale, p. 91. 
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Violent organizations would include the Ku Klux Klan, 
the Minutemen, the Christian Defense League, and the Sons of 
Liberty. Many of the Ku Klux Klan chapters have seemingly 
found a new source of strength which suspiciously coincides 
with the emergence of New Right groups. They have also 
pledged their allegiance to Ronald Reagan and his Republican 
presidency. Calvin Reeves, a Columbus, Georgia recruiter and 
organizer of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 
says the Klan is a political organization to the far right 
opposed to integration, forced busing, affirmative action, and 
increased social spending. He calls himself a radical Repub¬ 
lican and in a somewhat surprising symbolic gesture resigned 
his position when Ronald Reagan won the 1980 presidential elec¬ 
tion. He said at the time that the Republican administration 
in Washington, D. C. had taken over where the Ku Klux Klan was 
leaving off.^ 
The Ku Klux Klan chapters around the country are also 
getting bolder in their recruiting tactics. In Houston, Texas 
white KKK children are taught hand-to-hand combat. During an 
anti-busing rally in Decatur, Alabama a school bus was set on 
fire by youngsters wearing KKK t-shirts. The Invisible Empire 
faction of the Klan is reportedly stockpiling weapons and 
training its members to kill Blacks and Jews in preparation for 
a race war. Children have been special targets of the Klan 
and the National Education Association in a retaliatory move 
4 
"Ku Klux Klan Chapters Disband," The Atlanta Consti¬ 
tution , March 23, 1981, p. 1C. 
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has designed a curriculum guide for informed classroom discus¬ 
sions of separatism, white supremacy, racism, and violence. 
The guide was designed to help teachers deal with questions 
raised by students regarding the Klan.^ In Rome, Georgia in 
1981 a fifteen year old Black child became the target of a hate 
campaign led by Ku Klux Klansmen when he was involved in ques¬ 
tionable sexual activity with a white girl aboard a school bus- 
despite eyewitness accounts stating that the white girl ini¬ 
tiated the activity.^ 
There is therefore much evidence to suggest that the 
Klan in the 1980's is increasing its recruitment efforts in 
many sections of the country and is targeting children -for mem¬ 
bership. The Klan also identifies strongly with many of the 
stated goals of the Republican Party, such as opposition to 
gun control, opposition to the Supreme Court's intrusion into 
the family structure, support of the death penalty, and oppo¬ 
sition to forced busing to achieve racial quotas. Yale Univer¬ 
sity President A. Bartlett Giamatti attributes the rise in 
anti-semitic episodes and the growing visibility of the Klan 
with the rise of the New Right and the Moral Majority. He 
said that: 
... the New Right has licensed a new meanness of 
spirit in our land, a resurgent bigotry that 
^Carole Ashkinaze, "KKK Bold in Getting Recruits: NEA 
Study Assesses Child Exploiter Role," The Atlanta Journal/The 
Atlanta Constitution, June 14, 1981, p. 17B. 
£ 
Carole Ashkinaze, "With Klansmen's Help, Incident on 
School Bus Disrupts 2 Young Lives," The Atlanta Journal/The 
Atlanta Constitution, June 14, 1981, pp. IB, 16B. 
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manifests itself in racist and discriminatory pos¬ 
ture; in threats of political retaliation; in injunc¬ 
tions on censorship; in acts of violence.7 
The Klan would also be considered a racist organization, 
as would the American Nazi Party (whose name was changed to the 
National Socialist White Peoples' Party), the Christian Natio¬ 
nal Party, the National States' Rights Party, and the (white) 
Citizens Council. Traditional civil rights leaders fear that 
the conservative upsurge will dilute minority strength, parti¬ 
cularly voting rights. 
One important piece of civil rights legislation seems 
at this writing to be in jeopardy as a consequence of renewed 
racist sentiments around the country. The pre-clearance provi¬ 
sion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 will expire in the latter 
part of the summer of 1982 unless it is renewed by Congress. 
Some Congresspersons feel that the South has been labeled racist 
long enough, while Blacks and liberals feel otherwise. Tyrone 
Brooks, speaking to the Georgia Advisory Council to the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights, said that the right-wing 
conservative mood of America in the 1980's is leading to an in- 
g 
crease in racism. Brooks was only one of several witnesses 
who spoke on religious and racial bigotry. 
President Reagan has declared himself to be in favor 
of extending the Voting Rights Act, but civil rights leaders 
^Time, September 14, 1981, p. 28. 
g 
G. G. Rigsby, "Brooks: 100-year Rise in Racism is 
Now," The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution, September 
27, 1981, p. 4B. 
48 
are reluctant to count on any strong support from him. He 
initially was opposed to extending the Act because he felt the 
purpose had been accomplished and the South was being unduly 
accused of racist and discriminatory activities. 
Religious groups include the Liberty Lobby, which is 
both anti-semitic and neo-Nazi (and whose finances went to 
support George Wallace in his 1968 bid for the presidency). 
Another conservative religious group is the Christian Crusade 
led by Billy James Hargis. The period of the mid and late 
1960's was one where many of the fundamentalist colleges were 
created: The American Christian College, founded by Hargis; 
Pepperdine College in Los Angeles; The University of Plano near 
Dallas, Texas (which was funded by billionaire H. L. Hunt); 
Harding College in Searcy, Arkansas; and Bob Jones University 
in Greenville, South Carolina. Many of these colleges were 
founded in response to the Supreme Court's advocacy of integra¬ 
tion of public schools. 
President Reagan shocked many liberal thinkers by declar¬ 
ing himself in favor of lifting the ban on federal tax exemption 
to segregated private schools, saying he urged Congress to stop 
denying tax exempt status for religious, charitable, educational 
or scientific organizations on the grounds that they do not con¬ 
form to certain fundamental public policies. Bob Jones Univer¬ 
sity initiated a lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service 
9 
Ron Taylor and Katheryn Hayes, "Tax-exemption Decision 
Stirs up Issue of Segregation Academies," The Atlanta Journal/ 
The Atlanta Constitution, January 17, 1982, pp. IA, 4B. 
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when it cut the University off from its tax exempt status 
because of its admitted policy of racial discrimination. At 
Bob Jones there can be neither interracial dating nor inter¬ 
racial marriage. Bob Jones, III, President of the University, 
has filed suit and the case was to be argued before the Supreme 
Court early in 1982. Bob Jones is expected to claim the right 
of religious exercise as guaranteed by the first amendment. 
The case will be a landmark one because the decision-if Bob 
Jones wins-would allow more than 100 other schools to qualify 
for tax exempt status regardless of their racial discrimination 
practices. Of these 100 schools, 90 are in the South. Steve 
Suitts, Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council, 
says that lifting the ban could not come at a worse time because 
private segregated schools were beginning to lose their appeal 
as a white flight alternative because of their much higher tui- 
. • .10 tion costs. 
Dr. Thomas Smith, President of the Georgia Association 
of Christian Schools, sees nothing wrong with a school policy 
of excluding Blacks. He says that "if a person opposes Blacks 
and whites dating, wouldn't that be less likely to happen if 
they weren't together a lot?" ^ 
Political associations would include elements of all 
the others previously mentioned, but especially the John Birch 




Ibid., p. 4B. 
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The Young Americans for Freedom was also an important 
conservative organization of the aforementioned era. The YAF 
was composed of young people up to age thirty-nine who were 
staunch Goldwater supporters in his Presidential bid. They 
were formally organized in September 1960 to protest a 1959 
bill presented in the United States Congress which would have 
repealed the requirement for a loyalty oath from students re¬ 
ceiving federal aid under the 1958 National Defense Education 
12 
Act. The YAF was formed at William F. Buckley, Jr.'s family 
estate at Sharon, Connecticut. Buckley was part of an intel¬ 
lectual sect who argued that they were not so much against com¬ 
munism as they were against liberalism. Buckley said in Up 
from Liberalism, for instance, that "the problem is not how to 
get the vote for the Negro, but how to train the Negro-and a 
13 
great many whites-to cast a thoughtful vote." Buckley was 
not only fearful of liberalism but also socialism, Jews, civil 
rights, and the United Nations, but not necessarily in this 
order. He differed with some of the early members of the YAF 
in that he believed in the organization not only politically and 
Benjamin Epstein and Arnold Forster, Danger on the 
Right (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 224-227. 
■^Ibid. , p. 260. Buckley, like many other intellectuals, 
seemingly has a problem with theory and practice. While he 
might find nothing theoretically wrong with a collective society 
and political power of the masses, he disagrees with liberal 
attempts in the United States of putting this particular theory 
into practice. Buckley would therefore agree that the indivi¬ 
dual is an important component of society but he would disagree 
that the individual was ready to accept the benefits which 
liberalism would bestow upon him. The notion of communism would 
therefore be the ideal and not the real. 
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economically but ideologically as well. It is a paradox that 
14 
some of the Birchers thought even the YAF was too liberal. 
In the 1960's the Far Right was estimated to have 
spent from $20 to $30 million on political campaigns-and 
George Wallace received much of that financial support.^ He, 
like those who later would come to be identified with the New 
Right, used the tactic of adversarianism, i.e., being against. 
He was against a wide variety of things: pointy-headed profes¬ 
sors, Wall Street, federal liberal legislation, and liberals 
running the government.^ 
Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign was one 
which had some elements of adversarianism as well as a Southern 
strategy. He was strongest initially in the South and the 
Southwest and got little support from the Eastern establishment. 
He received only 27 million votes and carried 6 states-Arizona, 
Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Georgia. 
Goldwater was against civil rights progress as well as federal 
intervention in the affairs of private enterprise. Lyndon 
Johnson seemed to have won the fight for the Southern Rim as he 
won the Presidency. With Richard Nixon's win in 1968 the 
Southern Rim became even more confident of itself in national 
politics. Kirkpatrick Sale called this newly found power "cow¬ 












nonsense image. He said that "cowboy power in Congress begets 
cowboy legislation and cowboy legislation enhances cowboy 
„ 17 
power." 
It should be stated here that the Southern Rim is noted 
not only for its conservatism but also for its racism. The May 
1974 Report of the Equal Opportunity Commission showed that 
Blacks in the South and Southwest were underrepresented in white 
collar jobs, HUD at almost the same time was issuing figures 
which consistently revealed the fact that from one-half to two- 
thirds of the discriminatory complaints filed continued to come 
from the fifteen states which made up the Southern Rim. One 
should also note that George Wallace received nine million 
18 
votes from the Southern Rim. 
Allen Hunter states that although the more dynamic of 
the single-issue groups are independent of the New Right core, 
the New Right does try to assimilate these groups into the fold 
19 
as much as possible. It is also important to remember that 
most groups in the New Right retain their autonomy and raise 
much of their own funds. For example, although the National 
Right to Work Committee was founded in 1955 it has developed 
close ties with the New Right. The National Rifle Association, 
on the other hand, has refused all attempts at assimilation so 
the New Right has set up two competing gun organizatons of its 
"^Ibid. , p. 152. 
1 9, 
Ibid., p. 167. 
^Hunter, p. 120. 
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own: The Citizens for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms and 
Gun Owners of America. When the New Right could not assimi¬ 
late the National Right to Life Committee into its sphere of 
influence it set up the Life Amendment Political Action Com- 
20 
mittee and the American Life Lobby. 
When the Christian Voice, the Moral Majority, and the 
Religious Roundtable were founded in 1979 the religions connec¬ 
tion was brought into the New Right. This connection was im¬ 
portant not only because the media ministers could be counted 
on to put the conservative message across, but also because the 
ministers could be mobilized independently of single issue 
21 
groups as well as pay their own way financially. 
Professor Charles W. Dunn, Head of the Political Science 
Department at Clemson University, sees the theological ferment 
of this era as the fourth epoch in United States history, i.e., 
after the founding, the Civil War, and the New Deal. He also 
maintains that theology has been the primary variable in the 
three previous epochs. For instance, during the writing of the 
Constitution there was a basic distrust regarding the nature of 
man, so power was diffused not only through the system of checks 
and balances but also by means of the three levels of govern- 
22 
ment. During the Civil War era a somewhat liberal theology 
20 z Ibid., p. 123. 
^Ibid. , p. 124. 
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Charles W. Dunn, Professor/Department Head, Depart¬ 
ment of Political Science, Clemson University, "The Theological 
Foundations of American Public Policy," a paper prepared for 
the 1981 annual meeting of the American Political Science 
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eventually cried out for equality and social reform. During 
the New Deal social welfare became largely a concern of the 
federal government. Franklin Roosevelt reflected a similar 
feeling in his 1939 inaugural speech, saying: 
... the test of our progress is not whether we add 
more to the abundance of those who have too much; 
it is whether we provide enough for those who have 
too little.^3 
Dunn thus sees the new theological move to the right as a re¬ 
sponse to the previous success of the liberal theology in pub¬ 
lic policy formation.^ 
It becomes evident, then, that religion in politics 
is nothing new. What is new is the success of the mass-based 
organizations, and James L. Guth feels the success is due to 
a growing community concern and involvement and the greater 
organizational skills which come with education and occupa¬ 
tional advancement. The success can also be attributed to the 
personalities of media evangelicals such as Jerry Falwell, Pat 
Robertson, Jim Bakker, Oral Roberts, James Robinson, and Rex 
Humbard, who claim a total of 1400 radio, 30 television and 60 
cable television channels specializing in religious programs 
which generate approximately $500 million in revenue and over 
25 
$30 million in direct contributions. 
Association, New York, Hilton Hotel, September 3-6, 1981, p. 3. 
^Ibid. , p. 15 . 
2^Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
25 James L. Guth, Department of Political Science, Fur¬ 
man University, "The Politics of the Evangelical Right (An 
Interpretive Essay)," a paper presented for the 1980 meeting of 
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Another factor which pushed the ministers into politics 
has been the assault on Christian schools which emerged in the 
1960's as an answer to integrated schools. Falwell said in one 
of his many speeches on the subject that the constant harrass- 
ment by federal authorities of his Lynchburg Christian Academy 
2 6 
pushed him into politics. 
The Moral Majority is perhaps the largest of the reli¬ 
gious lobbyists that have gained political clout. The Moral 
Majority is registered as a nonprofit, non-exempt corporation 
27 
and can lobby and become involved in political campaigns. 
Jerry Falwell, leader of the Moral Majority, has a goal of 
working for government policies and legislation based on tradi¬ 
tional moral and biblical principles. His Old Time Gospel Hour 
television show in the late 1970's claimed to be on more than 
300 television affiliate stations and to having an audience in 
the millions. When asked how the idea of the Moral Majority 
came about he said that "I got tired of hearing about the 
silent majority and decided that my audience was a moral major- 
2 8 
ity and should finally join hands." Falwell personally is 
against gay rights, abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, pari¬ 
mutuel gambling, and even SALT II. He usually takes a pro- 
the American Political Science Association, New York, Hilton 
Hotel, September 3-6, 1981, pp. 4, 6. 
2 6 
Ibid., p. 8 . 
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Israel stance and said in 1981 when the announced plans to 
mobilize the group to lobby against the Reagan Administra¬ 
tion's plan to sell sophisticated radar planes to the Arab 
nations that "if America doesn't stand by Israel we will pay 
29 
an eternal price for it." 
Falwell is convinced that living by the principles of 
God promotes a nation to greatness. He says conversely that 
to violate the principles of God is to bring the nation to 
shame. In line with this philosophy he has designed a Chris¬ 
tian Bill of Rights which he personally presented to newly 
elected President Reagan. He asked Reagan to uphold the God¬ 
fearing principles contained within the Christian Bill of 
Rights. (See Appendix A.) 
The rhetoric of the Christian Right movement also con¬ 
tains elements of racism as well as anti-semitism. Bailey 
Smith, head of the Southern Baptist Convention, told his crowd 
that "God does not hear the prayers of the Jews."^ Pastor of 
the First Southern Baptist Church of Del City, Oklahoma, Smith 
is a typical fire and brimstone preacher. In an article 
written by Caleb Pirtle, III for The Atlanta Weekly magazine, 
Smith was described as "a street-fighting, old-fashioned 
preacher who attacks sin with the hard-nosed bare-knuckled 
31 
finess of a back-alley brawler." He was elected President 
? Q 
"Falwell Opposes Saudi Arms Deal; Takes Israeli 
Stance," The Atlanta Journal, April 23, 1981, p. 1. 
30 
Hunter, p. 127. 
^Caleb Pirtle, III, "The Boiling Waters of the 
Southern Baptists," Atlanta Weekly, May 17, 1981, p. 10. 
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of the Southern Baptist in 1980 and became-at age forty-one- 
the chief spokesman for thirteen million Southern Baptists. 
He grew up in Dallas, Texas and was graduated from both the 
Ouachita Baptist University in Arkansas and the Southwestern 
Baptist Theological Seminary in Fort Worth, Texas. He first 
entered the political arena when he gave the invocation at the 
1980 Democratic National Convention. He also spoke at the meet¬ 
ing held in Dallas, Texas which led to the forming of the Moral 
Majority. Then President Carter was very upset about this latter 
appearance because not only was Jerry Falwell present but also 
presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan and many other Republican 
personalities. It was at this meeting in Dallas that Smith made 
his famous statement: 
I'm telling you all other gods besides Jehovah and His 
son Jesus are strange gods. It's interesting to me 
that at great political battles how you have a Protes¬ 
tant to pray and a Catholic to pray and then you have 
a Jew to pray. With all due respect to those dear 
people, my friend, God almighty does not hear the prayer 
of the Jew. For how in the world can God hear the 
prayer of a man who says that Jesus Christ is not the 
true Messiah? It is blasphemous. It may be politically 
expedient but no one can pray unless he prays through 
the name of Jesus Christ.32 
The repercussions from the Jewish community were almost imme¬ 
diate. Theodore Freedman of the Anti-Defamation League said 
that "In my judgment the statement reflects at the very least 
33 
stupidity and at the most a manifestation of anti-semitism." 
Reverend Dan C. Fore, head of the Moral Majority of 
^Ibid. , p. 30. 
~^Ibid., pp. 11, 30, 31. 
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New York State also made a statement about the Jews which 
most Jews considered highly inflammatory. He said that: 
Jews have a God-given ability to make money, almost 
a supernatural ability to make money. They control 
the media and they control this city (meaning New 
York City).34 
Many of the statements made by the fundamentalist prea¬ 
chers are definitely racist without the word "race" ever being 
mentioned. Pat Robertson, founder of the Christian Broadcasting 
Network and co-host of the 700 Club television show, made a 
statement in a 1979 interview where he said that: 
The home is the basic unit of the church, the basic 
unit of the fabric of our society. Now when this 
goes you begin to have corollary problems .... You 
have the flotsam and jetsam of the ghetto where ^5 
young people don't even know who their parents are. 
With the code word "ghetto" (meaning Black) Robertson's meaning 
was all too clear. Many Black ghetto dwellers and their defen¬ 
ders understood him to be saying that Black people are morally 
bankrupt and have no one to blame but themselves. Blacks and 
other minorities are resented because they are portrayed as 
threats to the traditional moral and social order. 
In an April 11, 1981 interview hosted by David Susskind, 
ex-Senator Franch Church (Dem.-Idaho) said there is an element 
of intolerance and bigotry which frightens him when he thinks 
of the Moral Majority. He further stated that there is an 
element of absolutism which is dangerous in a free society. 
84 
Hunter, p. 127. 
^ "Politics, Power and the Christian Citizen: An 
Interview with Pat Robertson," Sojourners (September 1979), 
p. 20. 
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Daniel McGuire, President of the Society for Christian Ethics 
at Marquette University, said in the same interview that mem¬ 
bers of the Moral Majority remind him of fascists and totali- 
. 36 tanans. 
Even though there appears to be much in-fighting be¬ 
tween different racial and religious groups within the Moral 
Majority, political expediency has made attractive the idea of 
Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Mormons coming together under 
the auspices of the Moral Majority in order to fight common 
battles. Probably the largest meeting held with this objective 
in mind was the previously mentioned one held in Dallas, Texas 
on August 21-22, 1980. Sponsored by the Religious Roundtable, 
such notables as John Connally, Jesse Helms, and Philip Crane 
were in attendance as well as Falwell and Robertson. At this 
meeting the clergy was enlisted by the politicians to aid in 
the fight against the liberal members of Congress. In an at¬ 
tempt to rate members of Congress, these religious rightists 
created a morality index. Jerry Falwell, for instance, devised 
a code of minimum moral standards dictated by the Bible which 
would test candidates on issues such as abortion, homosexual 
rights, and capital punishment. He said that "We will judge 
them in percentile fashion on the moral issues and give the 
37 
Christian public an understanding of how each votes." 
The Moral Majority has exhibited a great deal of 
^ P.B.S., David Susskind Show, April 11, 1981, "Inter¬ 
view with ex-Senator Franch Church and Daniel McGuide," David 
Susskind, program moderator. 
37 
Ellerin and Kesten, p. 14. 
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influence in areas other than politics. Plans have been in the 
works for the creation of a new legal organization-The Citizens 
Legal Defense Fund-which would be the conservative answer to 
the American Civil Liberties Union. 
Zillah Eisenstein in an article entitled "Anti-feminism 
and the Politics of 1980" asserts that anti-feminism is what 
distinguishes the New Right from the Old Right. She offered a 
quote from George McGovern where he says 
The family issue raised by the right wing was a code 
word for putting women back in the kitchen, stripping 
them of any decision on the question of abortion, and 
forcing them back into the old or orthodox roles. 
Additionally, Rev. Don Wildmon, leader of the National 
Federation of Decency, wants to eliminate sex, violence, and 
profanity from the television airwaves. The NFD is the nerve 
center for a much larger organization-The Coalition for Better 
Television. The Coalition claims to have 4000 "trained" moni¬ 
tors nationwide who are distributed among thirty separate 
groups. The largest and best known of the groups is the Moral 
Majority. The Coalition's strongest weapon is the boycotting 
of products that are advertised during the offensive shows. 
Those who criticize this technique see the boycott as nothing 
short of political censorship which they see as much worse than 
rotten programming. Wildmon's technique has also be questioned 
because his definition of "good" and "bad" programs is fuzzy 
39 
and his research therefore seems to be flawed. Some feel that 
38 Eisenstein, "Anti-feminism and Politics of 1980, "p. 3 87. 
^Ron Powers, "The New 'Holy War' Against Sex and 
Violence,' T.V, Guide, April 18, 1981, pp. 6-10. 
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Wildmon is simply crying wolf and has nothing of empirical 
substance that can be used against the offensive shows. When 
he was on the verge of announcing a nationwide boycott of 
objectionable shows in June of 1981, he suddently called it 
off. Jerry Falwell said at the time that postponing the boy¬ 
cott would allow the Coalition to gather together additional 
supporters and build a war chest for a boycott of advertisers 
in the Fall 1981 network shows that would be deemed objec- 
40 
tionable at that time. 
Another important component of the New Right network 
is election funding, and The National Conservative Political 
Action Committee spent more money on political endeavors in 
1970 and 1980 than any other political action group. Accord¬ 
ing to the Federal Election Commission NCPAC spent $7,463,833 
41 
in those two years alone. Independent spending for or against 
candidates in the 1980 presidential and congressional elections 
topped $16 million-eight times what was spent in 1976 by people 
not connected with a candidate. The Federal Election Commis¬ 
sion reported that President Reagan was the primary beneficiary 
of these independent expenditures in the 1980 Presidential 
election; $14.1 million of this figure was spent by individual 
42 
political action committees. 
40 
Michele Greppi, "Minister Suckers a Lot of Folk 
with Boycott Talk," The Atlanta Journal, June 30, 1981, p. IB. 
41 Figures found in the article "Conservative Political 
Committees Exert New-found Force in Campaigns, " The Atlanta 
Journal/The Atlanta Constitution. 
“^"Independent Campaign Spending Jumps Eight Times from 
'76 to ’80," The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution, 
62 
Political action committees are really not an entirely 
new phenomenon. Business/corporate PACs have been around a 
long time and have usually backed Democrats because Democrats 
have historically been the incumbents. In 1975 there were 
1500 corporate PACs and they accounted for 78 percent of all 
43 
business and political contributions in 1978. In the begin¬ 
ning right wing PACs felt that even if they did not win elec¬ 
tions they could influence the winner to begin to think about 
the conservative weight which they carried. The New Right 
PACs are serious about "purifying" politics and concentrate 
their efforts on defeating not only liberals but also moderate 
Republicans. In 1976 NCPAC supported 208 candidates and 103 
of these candidates won. NCPAC was encouraged by this turn of 
events because they felt those who won were their ideological 
allies. In 1978 they targeted their efforts to defeating 
former Representatives John Anderson (Illinois), John Buchanan 
(Alabama), as well as Senators Ed Brooke (Massachusetts) and 
Clifford Case (New Jersey). Of these four, only Case was 
44 
defeated. 
By the end of 1977 NCPAC claimed victories in three 
special House elections: John E. Cunningham (Washington), 
Robert L. Livingston (Louisiana), and Arlan Strange (Minne¬ 
sota) . In 1978 they backed 40 percent of the candidates who 
November 29, 1981, p. 16A. 
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were elected to the House. In 1979 NCPAC claimed that 168 
members of the House could be counted upon to vote their posi¬ 
tion on certain issues. They also claimed that at least twenty- 
four United States Senators could be counted on in the same 
45 
way. 
NCPAC was formed in 1975 and Senator Jesse Helms is as 
much responsible for its existence as is John "Terry" Dolan. 
NCPAC is generally opposed to big labor and Washington-based 
left wing political action groups. In the 1980 political cam¬ 
paigns NCPAC was committed to defeating Senators Franch Church 
(Idaho), George McGovern (South Dakota), John Culver (Iowa), 
Birch Bayh (Indiana), and Alan Cranston (California). Of these 
five Senators Church, Bayh, Culver, and McGovern were defeated. 
It is no wonder that more traditional politicians are worried 
that the PACs might make judgmental errors in their ideological 
choice of candidates and will not therefore be accountable to 
anyone for these mistakes. John Dolan says in response to this 
charge that: 
In the hands of unethical people, groups could go in 
and lie through their teeth, but the tactics used by 
our group are necessary to overcome the advantages 
which Democrats have surrounded themselves. “ 
NCPAC and other such groups have a decided advantage over Demo¬ 
cratic and Republican fund-raising organizations who have to 
limit the amount of money they spend on political campaigns. 
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Ellerin and Kesten, p. 13. 
^"Conservative Political Committees Exert New-found 
Force in Campaigns," The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitu¬ 
tional , May 31, 1981, p. 34A. 
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NCPAC and other independent PACs have no such limitations and 
many opponents of the independent PACs see this as a very 
47 
serious loophole in the campaign spending regulations. 
NCPAC, of course, is not the only political action com¬ 
mittee of the New Right. There are many more and their tactics 
are very similar. The Committee for the Survival of a Free 
Congress (CSFC) is one other such PAC. It was founded by Paul 
Weyrich-who formerly worked in television and was one of the 
founders of the Moral Majority. The Conservative Caucus is 
also a relatively influential political organization. It was 
originally to be the party base of the proposed third party 
ticket of Wallace-Reagan in 1964. Its function now is to 
develop candidates and train campaign volunteers. It has coor¬ 
dinators in forty states and committees in 250 Congressional 
districts. It helped lead the fight against the Panama Canal 
treaties as well as the opposition to SALT II. It also pro¬ 
duces literature on the voting records of Congressmen as well 
48 
as fact sheets on controversial questions. 
The people who are members and who head up organiza¬ 
tions in the New Right are in many cases conservative in the 
Federal law places a $1000.00 limit per election on 
contributions to a candidate or the candidate's campaign com¬ 
mittee, but Federal Election Code, Rule 109 allows unlimited 
spending if it is not done at the candidate's request or with 
the candidate's knowledge. This law therefore allows NCPAC, 
for instance, to spend millions of dollars on a particular cam¬ 
paign. It also allowed Richard M. Devoss and Jay Van Andel, 
cofounders of Amway, to spend $71,000 and $68,000 respectively, 
for Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign. Devoss is also the 
National Finance Chairman of the Republican National Committee. 
48 Ellerin and Kesten, pp. 11-12. 
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traditional sense. They include such men as the previously 
mentioned Jesse Helms of North Carolina, Representative Phillip 
Crane of Illinois (who also heads up the American Conservative 
Union), Representative Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma, Representa¬ 
tive Steven Symms of Idaho, Representative Robert Bauman of Cali¬ 
fornia, and Morton Blackwell of the Committee for Responsible 
Youth Politics. All of the PACs have something in common and 
that something is fundraising. In that particular aspect, 
attention should be focused on one man who has become something 
of an expert in political direct mail activities: Richard 
Viguerie. 
Richard Viguerie started out as Executive Director of 
the Young Americans for Freedom. He worked for Eisenhower in 
1952 and 1956 and was a Harris County, Texas campaign chairman 
in 1960 and worked for Richard Nixon's candidacy. He founded 
the Richard A. Viguerie Company (RAVCO) in 1965 and as a result 
of that company's work now has the names of ten to twenty mil¬ 
lion conservative donors on computers. He obtained the names 
initially by going to the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
and copying the names of all those persons who had given $50.00 
or more to Barry Goldwater in his Presidential campaign bid. 
He raised $7 million for George Wallace in 1973 in an effort to 
help him retire his 1972 campaign debt. He also has helped 
Jesse Helms, Strom Thurmond, Phil Crane, the National Right to 
Work Legal Defense Fund, and NCPAC raise funds for various 
reasons. 
Viguerie sees the idea of coalition politics as an idea 
66 
that has long been legitimized by liberals. He, like many 
other right wing conservatives, is against certain key issues. 
He would like to see many programs eliminated, such as com¬ 
munity action programs, government film-making, the United 
States Travel Service, the Small Business Association, the 
Alaskan Railroad, the Highway Beautification Program, the 
Federal Election Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration. In his book The New Right : We're 
Ready to Lead he says that he strongly believes that the lib¬ 
eralism in the United States of the last three decades is dead. 
He subsequently goes on to demean liberals and their socialist 
notions for being too idealistic in theory and brutal in actual 
practice. He says that liberals inflict burdens and suffering 
49 
on every laboring man and woman in America. Like many other 
members of the New Right, Viguerie has a strong religious base 
and thrives on religious faith and believes organizations decay 
without it. 
Viguerie seems to be very optimistic about the conser¬ 
vative move which he feels has swept the United States for five 
major reasons: (1) the Left is not as advanced in the use of 
political technology such as that used by his organization, 
NCPAC, and the Moral Majority to immediately be able to tap 
sympathetic allies in fund raising efforts. In addition, tele¬ 
vision ministers such as Falwell and Robinson have much 
49 
Richard Viguerie, The New Right: We're Ready to Lead 
(The Viguerie Company, 1981), pp. 17-19. 
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experience in direct mail and telephone marketing techniques; 
(2) the federal government has financed a substantial part of 
the liberal organization and Ronald Reagan as President will 
drastically reduce the amount of this support; (3) while in 
1976 about 70 percent of big business PAC donations went to 
liberal endeavors, in 1980 the donations were almost evenly 
split between liberals and conservatves; (4) liberal supporters 
do not have the money to finance the many liberal efforts; and 
(5) liberals no longer have the issues to make people rally 
behind them.^ 
Bipartisan critics of Viguerie say that he is becoming 
a millionnaire while PAC's are wasting money on direct mailing. 
While Viguerie does in fact raise a lot of money, he sometimes 
receives half of all money raised. He admitted himself in 1978 
that he would probably raise $30 million for right wing causes 
and his operation would receive almost $15 million of that 
amount.^ Viguerie accuses the United States Post Office of 
really reaping much of the profit from the mailing, because of 
every dollar spent on direct mail thirty-five to forty cents 
go for postage. 
Another concern of supporters of the New Right is the 
competition they engage in with the Republican Party for contri¬ 
butions. W. A. Rusher in The National Review said that the 
Republican National Committee often indulged in fraudulent 
^Ibid. , pp. 21-24. 
^"Why the New Right Isn't Doing Well at the Polls," 
Business Week, p. 160. 
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appeals for money. The RNC, he said, sends its most visible 
leaders into the field where they talk about needing to fight 
certain issues when in fact there is no intention of fighting 
any such battle. This tactic initially hurt groups such as 
NCPAC because the public, given a choice between an established 
organization and one which is just forming, usually chooses 
to donate their money to an established organization such as 
the RNC. Viguerie and Company say they now have very few prob¬ 
lems collecting money because they make the distinction very 
clear about what the Republicans have and have not done with 
52 
the money which they raised. 
The New Right does more than simply contribute money 
to candidates, of course. They lobby for issues they feel are 
important, conduct polls, conduct training schools, and attempt 
to create election-winning coalitions. One of the coalitions 
the New Right takes credit for putting together was the very 
diversified one which was very supportive of Ronald Reagan in 
his bid for the top elective office of the land. Many of the 
members are not exactly pleased with Reagan's performance as 
President. They would like for him to turn his attention away 
from economic legislative considerations and instead concen¬ 
trate on more moral ones. Edward A. McAteer, President of the 
Religious Rountable, said that 
With Congressional passage of the President's tax 
bill, the administration in 1981 has accomplished 
52 
W. A. Rusher, "Raising Conservative Bucks," National 
Review, December 8, 1978, pp. 1531-1532. 
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the foremost goal on its agenda. Now it is impera¬ 
tive that top priority be given to the moral issues 
facing our nation, particularly legislation to pro¬ 
tect preborn human lives.53 
Moral Majority, Inc. in early January of 1982 issued 
a newsletter to all of its members and friends asking them to 
cast a vote to clean up America. The vote would be on three 
key issues: homosexuality, pornography, and abortion on demand. 
Falwell surmised in the newsletter that: 
... up until now, President Reagan and the Congress, 
by necessity, have been so busy trying to balance the 
budget and rebuild our national defense that they 
have pushed issues like homosexuality and abortion 
on demand and pornography off until 1982.54 
The results of the poll, according to Falwell, will be sent to 
every congressperson, state legislator, governors, judges, 
school board members, PTA presidents, television networks, 
major newspapers, and President Reagan.^ Moral Majority, Inc., 
then, seems prepared to make an all out attack on the moral 
issues which they see as most important in America today. 
The leaders of New Right organizations seem to feel 
that they have held off as long as they could in pushing Reagan 
into considering their agenda of social legislation. Richard 
5 3 
"The Right Leans on Reagan," The Atlanta Journal/The 
Atlanta Constitution, September 6, 1981, p. 15A. 
54 
The newsletter is dated January 2, 1982 and was appa¬ 
rently mailed to all 'friends of Moral Majority.' It is rela¬ 
tively easy to become such a friend-all that is required is a 
request to receive literature from the Moral Majority. This 
request leads Moral Majority to then assume it has gained a 
friend. 
55 
From the same newspaper. 
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Viguerie, for example, has no doubt in his mind that Reagan 
supports the conservative views of the New Right, but he feels 
that Congress is establishment-oriented and basically uncom¬ 
fortable with the concerns of middle America and must have 




It might be a most opportune time to note at this 
point that Barry Goldwater, a loyal conservative in the very 
traditional sense, sides against many of the personalities 
and groups of the New Right who express their religious and 
social views in a political context. He said that: 
I'm getting a little tired of people in this country 
raising hell because they don't happen to subscribe 
to every thought that person has. You could offer 
the Lord's name for some of these positions and you'd 
find some of these outfits objecting.57 
The reason for Goldwater's ire was the series of objections 
being made by leaders of the New Right who objected to Sandra 
O'Connor's nomination to become the first woman member of the 
Supreme Court. The New Right viewed Mrs. O'Connor as a foe 
for some of her more liberal beliefs, especially on the abor¬ 
tion question. In an interview which Barry Goldwater (one of 
Mrs. O'Connor's greatest supporters) gave in the latter part 
of 1981 he said that he did not think the people of the New 
Right were really talking about conservatism. He accused the 
C f. 
"New Right Holding off on Push for Touchy Legisla¬ 
tion, " The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution, Septem¬ 
ber 27, 1981, p. 4D. 
^Ellen Goodman, "Reagan Comes up Smelling Like A Rose 
with O'Connor Selection," The Atlanta Journal, July 15, 1981, 
p. 5B. 
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Moral Majority of giving conservatism a bad name, saying that: 
The religious issues of these groups have little or 
nothing to do with conservative or liberal politics. 
They are diverting us away from the vital issues 
that our government needs to address, such as national 
security and economic survival.^8 
Reagan's nomination of Sandra O'Connor as the first 
woman member of the Supreme Court has still not appeased those 
feminists and those who support feminist issues who view Rea¬ 
gan's administration as a malevolent one. Zillah Eisenstein 
in an article printed in the Spring 1982 issue of Signs: Journal 
of Women in Culture and Society says that the crisis which 
women in particular face in the 1980's is due to the sexual 
politics of the New Right. This sexual politics is anti¬ 
feminist and racist and desires to re-establish the model of 
the traditional patriarchal white family, according to Eisen¬ 
stein. Because the New Right sees a crisis in the family, it 
believes the family should bear responsibility for the health 
and welfare of individuals. Eisenstein feels that those who 
are supporters of the New Fight want wage-earning females to be 
removed from the labor force and returned home because it is 
these potentially radical women who can transform society. 
Feminism is seen as one step removed from liberalism and the 
New Right's anti-feminist stance coincides with its anti¬ 
liberal position. Anti-feminism is projected as being pro- 
family. Eisenstein says that the New Right defines a family 
as a married heterosexual couple with children, with the 
■^"Pulpit Bullies: Coldwater Blasts New Right," Time, 
September 28, 1981. 
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husband working in the labor force and the wife remaining at 
59 
home to rear the children. The New Right thus seeks to con¬ 
struct a society built around the traditional, self sufficient 
patriarchial family-even though non-traditional types of family 
situations continue to be formed in all parts of the country 
with surprising success. 
Those people who have a conservative philosophy have 
thus banded together to form a very diverse, pragmatic coali¬ 
tion. Religious concerns have been combined with political 
concerns. New Rightist groups have borrowed from the tech¬ 
niques of liberal coalitions of the 1950's and 1960's. These 
modern day coalitions are perhaps unique because they were not 
formed along party lines per se and friends become indistin¬ 
guishable from enemies. Because of the diversity of these 
newly formed coalitions, there arose a need to have their ideas 
and ideology explained in a coherent fashion. Neoconservatives 
took up this challenge and have become one of the strongest com¬ 
ponents of the New Right, as can be witnessed in the next chap¬ 
ter which attempts to assess their importance. 
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Eisenstein, "Understanding the Crisis of Liberalism 
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CHAPTER IV 
NEOCONSERVATIVES 
Intellectuals have always played an important role in 
the formation of new political coalitions, so any meaningful 
discussion of conservative coalitions must include the impor¬ 
tant and necessary role that intellectuals serve in the forma¬ 
tion of coalitions.^ In "Intellectuals and the American Poli¬ 
tical System" Stanley Rothman surmised that every civilization 
of recorded history has developed a stratum of intellectuals. 
He further stated that intellectuals have been the creators, 
guardians, and interpreters of the basic symbols of power and 
have been closely aligned with those who directly exercise 
2 
power. Further, in societies which have had limited literacy, 
3 
intellectuals became the critics of the rulers. 
Charles Kadushin feels the word "intellectual" itself 
is derived from the nineteenth century Russian term "intelli¬ 
gentsia." These were the people who were concerned with matters 
of public interest, felt a personal responsibility for the state 
‘'‘Intellectuals, for instance, seemed to be the major 
force in preparing for the French Revolution, even though they 
were not pleased with the final results of that Revolution. 
In nineteenth and early twentieth century America intellectuals 
were strongly in favor of changing child labor laws, of creating 
more favorable conditions for Blacks and other minorities, and 
were usually at the forefront of anti-imperialist war sentiments. 
^Lipset, p. 325. 
3Ibid., p. 326. 
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and the solution of its1 problems, tended to view political 
and social questions as moral ones, and felt obligated to do 
4 
something in life as well as thought. A useful definition 
of intellectual, then, is perhaps one which Kadushin presents: 
One who is an expert in dealing with high quality general ideas 
on questions of values and esthetics and who communicates his 
5 
judgments on these matters to a fairly general audience. 
Kadushin also points out that being an intellectual is a purely 
£ 
social role; that is to say, no one is wholly intellectual. 
The United States can be said to have been founded by 
intellectuals. The intellectual elite in 1787 was deciding the 
fate of the rest of the country. The fifty-five men who were 
present at the Constitutional Convention consisted of the elite 
of government, business, and the professions. They were ship¬ 
pers, scholars, and statesmen. More than half of them were 
lawyers. Twenty-nine were graduates of colleges in either 
7 
Britain or America. 
As early as 1830, though, personalities such as Andrew 
Jackson were becoming anti-intellectual and were attempting to 
break through the wall of formality which had been constructed 
to keep non-intellectuals out of positions of authority. Many 
of the intellectuals became identified with a liberal ideology; 
4 
Kadushin, p. 4. 
5Ibid., p. 7. 
^Ibid., p. 5. 
7Alistair Cooke's America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1973), pp. 132-137. 
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they were more likely as not the ones who voiced sentiments 
against slavery and later against American imperialsim. By the 
1930's many intellectuals had moved into the Communist Party 
and had begun to write articles and books and worked on the 
8 
staffs of national magazines doing research and other tasks. 
These positions of intellectuals were of course fully taken 
advantage of by the liberals. 
The transmission of ideas has always been important for 
intellectuals. Kadushin says that literary political journals 
act as certification for intellectuals who edit them as well as 
write for them and there is a tight inner core of persons in- 
9 
volved in the whole literary process. Journals and magazines 
provide both communication and feedback. It is therefore no 
mere coincidence that when intellectuals want to prevent a 
novel idea they usually do so in journals such as The New York 
Review of Books, New York Times Book Review, the New Yorker, 
New Republic, Harpers, Partisan Review, Saturday Review, Nation, 
Daedalus, and Ramparts. 
By the 1950's, then, intellectuals had assumed teaching 
and research positions on many college and university campuses 
in the United States. Even as early as the 1950's anti-Vietnam 
sentiments and pro civil rights sentiments were attracting intel¬ 
lectual converts, in word if not in fact in deed. By the 1970's, 
however, the concept of neoconservatism was beginning to emerge. 
^Lipset, pp. 328-334. 
9 
Kadushin, p. 14. 
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There was a re-evaluation of the liberal stances being taken 
by intellectuals as they became part of the establishment 
instead of opponents of it. Intellectuals began to back off 
from some of their more liberal positions and instead chose 
to deal with more traditional values. Norm Chomsky said that 
the academicians were so glad to be part of the establishment 
that they began to identify with United States policies and 
were willing to defend these policies all the way.'*'*"* The 
intellectuals then began to take a more pragmatic look at their 
function and commenced to see themselves in decision making 
roles instead of mere analysts of past events. Irving Kristol 
said in 1974 that intellectuals have always taken an adversary 
posture and have always thought they knew how society should be 
run and resented the fact that people did not usually listen to 
them. Neoconservatives, then, seem to have bridged this gap. 
They seem now to have direct communication with those in power, 
even though some of the intellectuals interviewed by Kadushin 
felt they should have no relationship with men of power. They 
said that: 
... the two are really incompatible .... In 
order to preserve his political effectiveness 
he (the intellectual) is inhibited from saying 
certain things .... At the same time commit¬ 
ment vitiates the full exercise of his intellect. 
Once you have gotten committed to something, you 
^Ernest Kaiser, "In Defense of the People's Black and 
White History and Culture," Part I, Freedomways . (.1st Quarter, 
1970), p. 57. 
-^Robert W. Glasgow, "The Suburbanized World: Countries 
that Become More Equal don't Necessarily Become Happier" (A 
conversation with Irving Kristol), Psychology Today (February 
1974), p. 76. 
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cannot really think in an absolutely free way about 
i t. 12 
A common characteristic of intellectuals is the dislike 
for labels. Neoconservatives are no different. Many of them 
reluctantly accept the label neoconservative because it seems 
to best describe their position. Edith Efron feels that labels 
are invaluable to political analysis because they represent 
both competitive and self-contradictory theories of the individ¬ 
ual's relationship to the state,^ while Edward Genovese says 
that labels usually defy close definitions because they histo¬ 
rically might have been different from what they presently are. 
For instance, classical liberalism rose to a powerful position 
fighting big government, bureaucratic centralization, vigorous 
state intervention in the economy, and vast welfare schemes, 
positions which are now taken by conservatives. Nathan Glazer 
feels there should be two axes to define a political position; 
one to define one's attitude toward liberty and another to 
define an attitude about equality.Irving Krisol, however, 
admits that he is comfortable with the label neoconservative. 
He says that politics begins and ends in orthodoxy so it also 
begins and ends in conservatism. Because it is in the nature 
of things for what is born to decay, there comes dissatisfaction, 
■'•^Kadushin, p. 302. 
■*-^"What is a Liberal-who is a Conservative?" (Part of a 
sumposium) , Commentary, Volume 62 (September 1976), p. 51. 
14Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
15 
Ibid., PP • 61-62. 
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dissent and heresy. There then comes, he further says, the 
search for a new orthodoxy to breathe new life into the old 
tradition. This effort gives rise to neoconservatism. Kristol 
extends this defense of neoconservatism by urging all American 
Jews (he is a Jew) to be politically neoconservative because 
neoconservatism is synonymous with Judaism, for Judaism too 
seeks to give new meaning to old (religious) traditions.^ 
Kadushin in 1974 identified 200 intellectuals and ac¬ 
tually interviewed 110 of them. While he did not reveal the 
names of those whom he interviewed, he did reveal that 67 
percent of them considered themselves radical while 33 percent 
felt they were conservative and/or moderate. In 1964 33 per¬ 
cent said they were conservative and/or moderate, 33 percent 
17 
said strong liberal, and 33 percent said radical. This survey 
becomes even more interesting when one considers those who 
Kadushin "alluded" to interviewing: Daniel Bell, Irving 
Kristol, Daniel P. Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, and James Q. Wilson. 
All of these personalities are now firmly entrenched in the 
ranks of the neoconservatives. 
Intellectuals have either direct or indirect relation¬ 
ships with men of power. Direct relationships are those which 
include personal contact or an attempt to communicate an idea 
or point of view or policy to specific persons of power. In¬ 
direct relationships are those which include writing, speaking, 
^Ibid., pp. 74-75 . 
“^Kadushin, p. 95. 
79 
or some other literary form. The 110 intellectuals interviewed 
by Kadushin placed men who were in political power into four 
categories: members of the White House staff, the President, 
high level officials in the cabinet, and members of both houses 
18 
of Congress as well as their aides. 
In The New Conservative: A Critique from the Left, 
Lewis Coser and Irving Howe feel that American neoconservatives 
19 
express only a mood and not a deeply felt political stance. 
There nevertheless does seem to be a clear-cut philosophy of 
neoconservatism. Proponents of neoconservatism take the posi¬ 
tion that social problems are best solved by economic growth 
rather than a redistribution of wealth. They emphasize the 
necessity for orderly economic reform. Neoconservatives are 
consumed with a fear of the advocacy of equality. Irving 
Kristol says that equality is good only to the extent that when 
it is mixed with certain other things the mixture is good. He 
says further that to set up an abstract standard of measurement 
of equality is meaningless because countries which have tried to 
20 
become more equal have not necessarily become happier. 
Charles Kesler says that the Declaration of Independence 
is a legalistic document and does not expound the virtues of 
equality. Conservatives, then, say the Declaration is more 
■^Ibid., pp. 296, 298. 
19 Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe, editors, The New Con¬ 
servatives: A Critique from the Left (New York: Quadrangle/The 
New York Times Book Company, 1973), p. 4. 
20 
Glasgow, p. 73. 
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about liberty than it is about equality. Conservatives further 
state that the equality clause in the Declaration speaks to the 
equality of Americans as a group and not necessarily indivi¬ 
dually. John Calhoun said in 1848, for instance, "the notion 
that all men were born free and equal was the most false and 
21 
dangerous of all political errors." 
Daniel Moynihan said in his Moynihan Report that liberty 
22 
has been the ideal while equality was more or less tolerated. 
Noeconservatives seem to support a negative liberty; that is, 
the right to be left alone. Equality seems to threaten liberty 
as well as the structure of American governmental power. Neo¬ 
conservatives see equality as an aspiration that can never be 
reached and many of them see it as a code word for "revolu- 
23 
tion." 
Zillah Eisenstein states that neoconservatives are for 
equality of opportunity rather than equality of condition. They 
see the welfare state as being in a crisis stage because the 
demand for equality will never be fulfilled because it will only 
breed more demands for equality. Neoconservatives are anti¬ 
affirmative action because it predetermines the outcome of com¬ 
petition. The welfare state is also seen in this light and neo¬ 
conservatives see middle class professionals as being placed 
21 Charles Kesler, "Special Meaning of the Declaration 
of Independence," National Review, Volume 31 (July 6, 1979), pp. 
850-859. 
22 . 
Peter Steinfels, "Neoconservatives and the Fear of 
Equality," Dissent, Volume 26 (Spring 1979), p. 170. 
23Ibid., p. 181. 
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in a position of attending to the needs of the non-working 
population. These middle class professionals include such 
people as lawyers, city planners, social workers, educators, 
criminologists, sociologists, and public health officials, to 
, , 24 name only a few. 
Neoconservatives, then, grew out of the same discon¬ 
tent that was exhibited in the 1960's. There was dissatisfac¬ 
tion with the performance of the United States in the Vietnam 
War as well as a discontent with the slow progress of the civil 
rights movement. A good argument can be made for supporting 
the statement that the New Left and neoconservatism grew out 
of the same movement. Coser and Howe say that neoconservative 
25 
writers are simply former liberals who got cold feet. Many 
of the neoconservatives got frightened by the implication of 
the 1954 Brown v Topeka Board of Education Supreme Court deci- 
2 6 
sion. Many more of them blamed President Johnson for the 
riots of the 1960's because they felt he had promised too much. 
They blamed the Warren Court for sanctioning social disorder 
27 
through its 1964 Reynolds v Sims decision. They said the 
Supreme Court was too activist as far as criminal justice was 
24 Zillah Eisenstein, "Understanding the Crisis of 
Liberalism for the 1980's," Signs, pp. 567-588. 
25 
Coser and Howe, p. 5. 
^Brown 1 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Brown 2 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). 
27 
377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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concerned and this fact could be illustrated by citing the 
2 8 29 
Miranda and Escobedo decisions. Peter Steinfels says 
that neoconservatism has from the beginning been attached to 
political and cultural moderation, committed to stability 
and pessimistic about the possibilities for long range change 
• » • 30 m America. 
Neoconservatives are distinctive in three other 
aspects. They see the problem of the country as being first 
of all cultural. They see a problem with morals, religion, 
education; almost everything is blamed except the notion of 
there being a breakdown in capitalist institutions. Capi¬ 
talism as a matter of faith is defended by neoconservatives. 
Neoconservatives also see a problem with what Lionel Trilling 
calls "adversary culture." This is perceived to be a subver¬ 
sive element in society which is against bourgeoisie society, 
against social restraints, has a contempt for convention, and 
seems to be estranged against those things which are usually 
traditionally embraced: the home, the family, and doing a 
routine job. Finally, neoconservatives have a disdain for a 
class of people whom they label "the new class." Sometimes 
it includes all college educated persons. At other times it 
refers only to those inhabitants of affluent pockets of cer¬ 
tain inner cities. The definition of new class remains both 
28384 U.S. 436 (1966) . 
29378 U.S. 478 (1964) . 
29Steinfels, Esguire, p. 24. 
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fuzzy and contradictory. There seems to be an ambivalence by 
31 
neoconservatives toward their own kind. Irving Kristol 
feels, for instance, that one of the problems with the new 
class is that too many college graduates are massed-produced 
at too many colleges and universities and these newly formed 
32 intellectuals feel duty bound to take adversary positions. 
The neoconservatives have also coined a term which 
they call "the underclass." This term as defined by them is 
that large, ineducable, unemployable element of the urban 
population that is alien to most middle class norms of be¬ 
havior. The underclass is perceived to be the primary ob¬ 
stacles to success of the government's poverty, housing, and 
unemployment programs.^ 
One of the important functions of neoconservatives, 
then, is to create new definitions for relatively old concepts. 
This function becomes a detrimental one if the problem is 
defined incorrectly because the solution will also be incor¬ 
rect. Neoconservative definitions seem to lessen the serious¬ 
ness of the problems which face the country. The definitions 
tend to blame the victims for the crime. This characteristic 
is not unusual, for neoconservative concerns are also the 
concerns of the people who are identified with the New Right: 
liberal attitudes toward crime prevention, feminism, the 
liberal left politics of professors, the breakdown of authority 
^ ■'■Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
^Glasgow, p. 76. 
■^Steinfels, Esquire, p. 28. 
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in the culture, student radicalism, affirmative action, govern 
ment regulators, and runaway democracy- Their concerns are 
transmitted through books, journals, and television talk shows 
They have become patrons of institutions such as the American 
Enterprise Institute, a very strong conservative think tank. 
The AEI produces tapes, journals, and books in which neocon¬ 
servatives give their political analyses. Neoconservatives 
are also involved with the Hoover Institution, the Institute 
for Contemporary Studies, and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. The network therefore seems to be 
firmly in place and the dissemination of ideas no longer 
becomes a problem because neoconservatives currently express 
opinions which reflect the mood of a very vocal segment of the 
population. 
The first part of the next section will examine a 
group of neoconservatives who seem to be contradictory on the 
one hand but not necessarily so when they are scrutinized more 
closely. These are the people who have been identified as 
Black neoconservatives, who are channeled into the same in¬ 
stitutions and literary journals as their white counterparts. 
CHAPTER V 
BLACKS AND THE NEW RIGHT 
Since racist attitudes and practices have previously- 
been identified as outstanding features of the New Right move¬ 
ment, it thus seems of some utility to explore how two diver¬ 
gent groups within the Black community respond to ideas and 
program proposals of those on the New Right. The first group 
is the Black neoconservatives who, like their white counter¬ 
parts, are primarily intellectuals who are instilled with a 
traditional conservative philosophy. The civil rights leaders, 
on the other hand, are a vocal and activist group who are both 
against the theory and practice of the New Right. Civil rights 
in general will therefore make up the second portion of this 
chapter. 
Another characteristic of the New Right is its prag¬ 
matism, and one way to measure its success or failure might be 
to observe how closely its objectives are being paralleled in 
the national governmental structure. Many of the political 
workers among the New Right claim primary responsibility for 
Ronald Reagan’s successful Presidential victory in 1980; there¬ 
fore Reagan's proposed economic and social programs will be 
examined to see how closely they compare with those which the 




Among the many ways of studying Black political 
thought in the United States, there have been three ways that 
have been predominant in the polemics of this thought. These 
three methods have been discussed by various scholars, in¬ 
cluding Hanes Walton, Jr. Walton, in an article entitled 
"Black Political Thought: The Problem of Characterization," 
cites the three approaches as the consensual approach, the 
conflictual approach, and the multi-faceted approach.^ 
Those analysts who adhere to the consensual approach 
emphasize the monolithic character of Black political thought; 
those who use the conflictual approach focus on the disagree¬ 
ment among Black thinkers; and finally, those who employ the 
multi-faceted approach assume that there are several cetego- 
ries of Black political thinkers. The latter approach is the 
one which is of greatest concern to this writer as it relates 
to this chapter. 
Black political thought has historically reflected 
many strains of speculation. This diversity of thought can 
be comprehended by realizing immediately that there is no 
one Black experience, and as Walton asserts, Black political 
2 
thought has developed from those diverse situations. Black 
political thought has suffered from the restraints of 
■''Hanes Walton, Jr., "Black Political Thought: The 
Problem of Characterization," Journal of Black Studies 
(December 1970), pp. 213-217. 
2Ibid. 
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not being considered relevant and therefore has been virtually- 
ignored. White writers have had a monopoly on scholarship and 
Mack Jones and Alex Willingham have coined a term for them: 
"White custodians of the Black experience." Jones says that 
white writers have also historically had a monopoly on the pre- 
scientific stage of inguiry. This stage is identified by Jones 
as that ineffable world where normative rules are sanctioned, 
academic disciplines evolved, paradigms developed (as well as 
their corresponding frames of reference), concepts formed, and 
more importantly, those configurations of regularities which 
constitute how problems are decided upon.^ 
Much of what has passed for Black political thought 
concentrates not on this crucial stage but on the scientific 
stage, where the basic agenda has already been decided. Black 
political thinkers who ignore the pre-scientific stage have 
placed themselves in the position not only of accepting the 
4 
white scholar's reduction of pure fact but also of being 
defenders of someone else's privileged status. 
Black thinkers have historically included professional 
sociologists, political scientists, economists, historians, 
and philosophers. Their analyses have at times been influenced 
by their own particular disciplines as well as their personal 
Black experiences. Those thinkers who I have identified as 
^Mack H. Jones, "The Epistemological Vacuum in Black 
Critiques of Contemporary Social Science," a paper prepared 
for delivery to the Conference on the African Mind in the New 
World, Rutgers University, November 18-20, 1976. 
^Ibid. 
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Black neoconservatives are mainly sociologists and economists 
and have simply taken it upon themselves to expand their field 
of expertise into other areas, 
Earle Thorpe's Mind of the Negro (1960) was perhaps 
the first effort devoted specifically to an examination of 
Black political thought. Thorpe said that by 1950 Blacks had 
bought the whole package of the American dream-capitalism, 
5 
freedom, and equality-and had become thoroughly Americanized. 
They truly began to believe that the dream applied to them and 
their hard work and industriousness would pay off as it did 
for other groups of Americans. Perhaps this was also the 
modern-day evolution of Black conservative political thought, 
because post-1960 political thought had become very pragmatic. 
The activist tradition of the Civil Rights era was, after all, 
alleged by some to be pro-capitalist and its leaders were as 
trapped by the system as those whose rights they attempted to 
defend.^ The philosophy of the Civil Rights movement of the 
1950's and 1960's always seemed to be materialistic. Adolph 
Reed, Jr. contends that the Civil Rights brokers of the 1960's 
continued to remain friendly with corporate liberals because 
they never seriously attempted to raise fundamental questions 
5 
Alex Willingham, "Prudence, Empathy, Dependency, Voli¬ 
tion: Changing Themes in Approaches to the Study of Black 
Political Thought," paper presented to Afro-American Political 
Theory class, Atlanta University, Political Science Department, 
Fall 1981. Mimeographed. 
£ 
Harold Cruse, "Mass Media and Cultural Democracy," 
The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (Morrow Paperback, 1967), 
pp. 64-95. 
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regarding the why and who of oppression and who was benefiting 
from same. The Civil Rights ideology thus suited not only the 
goals of monopoly capitalism but also affirmed the liberal 
7 
welfare state, according to Reed. 
The Civil Rights movement can therefore be charged with 
being a conservative movement in the sense that one of its 
purposes was to integrate into the system instead of changing 
it. The Civil Rights leaders believed in the American dream 
and if pressed would assert that there was a direct lineage 
between the American Revolution and the Black Revolution. The 
Black Revolution was ideally about democracy, freedom, dignity, 
g 
and equality. The Civil Rights leaders almost invariably 
perceive the continued need for government interventionist 
policies to correct the pathologies of the Black predicament. 
At the same time, they see themselves as the power brokers who 
should have a say in the formulation as well as the implementa¬ 
tion of these policies and programs. It was therefore not 
unusual to observe that when many of the programs were initiated 
as a result of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act and Lyndon 
Johnson's conceptual interpretation of a "Great Society," per¬ 
sonalities such as Leon Sullivan, Joseph Lowery, Jesse Jackson, 
and Ralph Abernathy became the leading consultants as to which 
"^Alolph L. Reed, Jr., "Black Particularity Recon¬ 
sidered," TELOS (Spring 1979), pp. 71-93. 
^Samuel Dubois Cook, "The American Liberal Democratic 
Tradition the Black Revolution, and Martin Luther King, Jr.," 
in Hanes Walton's The Political Philosophy of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 
1971), p. xxix. 
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programs should be considered priorities and how they should 
be implemented. In many cases these personalities and others 
created programs of their own or their existing organizations 
became eligible for federal funding. 
The Civil Rights ideology has of late received its 
greatest challenge from people such as Thomas Sowell, Walter 
Williams, and J. A. Y. Parker, all of whom have gained some 
degree of prominence only during the last ten years or so. 
These Black thinkers have begun to question the consequences 
of government-funded programs. These Black political thinkers 
further castigate not only liberals and the programs which 
they initiate but also the people who the programs are designed 
to help. 
Black thinkers such as Thomas Sowell enthusiastically 
identify with a conservative philosophy even though they ex¬ 
press dissatisfaction with the label "conservative" as it is 
traditionally used. Sowell holds the opinion that the concept 
of conservativism is : 
... virtually devoid of specific content. If a con¬ 
servative is someone who wants to conserve much of 
the existing order, then what he is specifically in 
favor of depends upon what the current order happens 
to be 9 
Robert L. Woodson, a Black resident fellow at the American 
Enterprise Institute, also refuses to use the term conserva¬ 
tive in describing himself and prefers to think of himself as 
a pragmatist with elements of liberalism, conservatism, Black 
^Thomas Sowell, "What is a Liberal-Who is a Conserva¬ 
tive?", Commentary (September 1976), pp. 98-99. 
91 
nationalism, and American patriotism. 
Despite the ambivalence towards accepting the concept 
of conservatism, several Black personalities have been identi¬ 
fied as either Black conservatives or Black neoconservatives, 
and they have enjoyed tremendous exposure since the 1980 presi¬ 
dential election victory of Ronald Reagan. This fraternity 
of Black conservatives includes Sowell, who is an educator and 
presently a fellow at the Hoover Institution; J. A. Y. Parker, 
self-educated president of the Lincoln Institute for Research 
and Education as well as being editor of The Lincoln Review; 
and Walter Williams, Professor of Economics at George Mason 
University in Fairfax, Virginia. 
Because of the misconceptions that abound regarding 
the liberalism of the Democratic Party and the conservatism of 
the Republican Party, Black conservatives have traditionally 
been thought to identify with the Republican Party. The 
Republican Party was admittedly the party through which Blacks 
first entered the political arena post-emancipation. This 
entry in most cases amounted to nothing more than Hobson's 
choice; Blacks could not vote at all if they did not register 
as Republicans. The fact still remains, however, that even 
after the 1944 Smith v Allwright (321 U.S. 649) United States 
Supreme Court decision which outlawed the "white primary" 
scheme which had been used by the Democrats, some Blacks still 
remained loyal to the Republican Party. These Blacks are 
l^Lee A. Daniels, "The New Black Conservatives," The 
New York Times Magazine, October 4, 1981, p. 23. 
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therefore thought to adhere to Republican policies of indivi¬ 
dual initiative, free enterprise, fiscal responsibility, oppo¬ 
sition to big government as well as to the welfare state. 
The New York Times Magazine in one of its 1981 articles 
distinguishes Black conservative politicians from Black con¬ 
servative philosophers. Black conservative politicians would 
include such people as Gloria E. A. Toote, a New York lawyer 
and real estate entrepreneur; Arthur Fletcher, Washington busi¬ 
ness consultant; Edward W. Brooke, the former Massachusetts 
senator; William Coleman, former Secretary of Transportation 
under Gerald Ford; Samuel Pierce, the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development under Ronald Reagan; and Thaddeus Garrett, 
domestic advisor to Vice-President George Bush. The distinc¬ 
tion seems to imply that politicians are very actively and per¬ 
sonally involved in the political process and very readily 
identify with party as well as personalities. Black conserva¬ 
tive politicians have for the most part accepted the Republican 
Party principles and platform, although some of them have 
11 
occasionally joined the fight with Civil Rights leaders. 
Thaddeus Garrett, for instance, is a fourth generation 
Republican (his great-grandfather was the first Black to serve 
on the Republican Central Committee in Nashville in the 1880's) 
but in 1972 he acted as strategist for Shirley Chisholm in her 
unsuccessful presidential bid. He said in an interview with 
Black Enterprise that Black Republicans reciprocate in terms of 
11 Ibid. 
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support much more than Black Democrats do. He said further 
that Black Republicans use their business savvy and their 
access to cash much more readily for Democrats than the other 
12 
way around. Gloria Toote also conceded in the New York 
Times Magazine interview that though Black Republicans do not 
totally agree with the Civil Rights leaders, their consti- 
13 
tuency must be acknowledged, recognized, and wooed. 
Black conservative philosophers, on the other hand, 
adhere to pre-1930's conservative thought as manifested in the 
United States and discern that the social programs begun in the 
early 1960's have failed because the need was different than 
it was in the 1930's. They say that the liberal penchant for 
regulation has checked private enterprise and they therefore 
favor massive government de-regulation. While the Civil Rights 
leaders are as committed as ever to their analysis of what the 
problem is (racism) and the solution (government intervention) , 
Black philosophical conservatives dislike purely racial expla¬ 
nations. They focus mainly on economic and structural analyses 
, .. 14 
of the issues. 
Abram Harris would seem to agree with the avoidance of 
purely racial explanations. He said that race psychology is 
an obstruction to a universality of thought among Black people. 
12Jacqueline Trescott, "When this Man Speaks does 
Reagan Listen?", Black Enterprise (August 1981), pp. 30-32. 
■^Daniels, pp. 23, 54. 
14 
Murray Friedman, "The New Black Intellectuals," 
Commentary (June 1980), p. 47. 
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So absorbed is the Black liberal intellectual with the race 
problem that problems of labor, housing, taxation, judicial 
reform, and war are relegated to positions of minor signifi¬ 
cance, according to Harris, even though these too are issues 
that affect Black folk.'*'"’ Nathan Wright, Jr., educator, 
author, and chairman of the National Assault on Illiteracy 
Program declares that "Racism no longer has a damn thing to do 
16 with the still perilous predicament of Black America." 
William J. Wilson, author of The Declining Signifi¬ 
cance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions, at¬ 
tempts to demonstrate that since the shift in the American 
social structure to modern industrialization the basis of 
racial antagonism has also shifted away from Black-white econo¬ 
mic contact to social, political, and community issues. The 
net result is an ever increasing class division among Blacks, 
17 
Wilson asserts. Class has been elevated to a position of 
greater importance than that of race. J. A. Y. Parker believes 
that race relations in the United States has steadily improved 
since the 1954 Brown v Topeka (347 U.S. 497 and 349 U.S. 294) 
Supreme Court decisions. 
Many of the Black conservative philosophers constantly 
repeat the same theme: that is, as Parker puts it, the self- 
■*"^Alex Willingham, "Black Political Thought in the 
U.S.: A Characterization" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
North Carolina, 1974), p. 118. 
16 Daniels, p. 20. 
17 William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of 
Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), passim. 
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appointed liberal Black spokesmen do not report the good news 
regarding Black progress because they represent their own 
views and these views are a detriment to successful race rela¬ 
tions. They are the elite, Parker says, and do not therefore 
speak for the non-elite. These leaders therefore play upon 
the guilt of white America in order to procure private grants 
of aid and federal funds to finance the organizations which 
employ them."^ 
In Ethnic America, Thomas Sowell asserts that the cri¬ 
teria of race is not adequate in explaining the condition of 
Blacks in present twentieth century United States. Other cri¬ 
teria which are more important to Sowell are the average age 
of the ethnic group, regional distribution, cause and effect of 
discrimination (as opposed to its moral offensiveness), educa¬ 
tion (or lack of), fertility, longevity, crime, I.Q., and 
19 
pathologies (such as alcoholism). 
Of course those on the left do not fail to challenge 
some of the positions taken by Black conservative philosophers. 
Some, like liberal Black Congressman and Chairman of the Con¬ 
gressional Black Caucus Walter Fauntroy, choose simply to dis- 
20 
miss them. The Black politicians who take a conservative 
stance also sometimes see fit to challenge the Black 
18 
P. B. S. Tony Brown's Journal, December 16, 1980, 
"Black 'Leaders' Shortchange their People for Selfish Gain," 
Tony Brown, moderator. 
19 Thomas Sowell, Ethnic America: A History (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1981), passim. 
20 Daniels, p. 23. 
96 
conservative philosophers. Gloria Toote disagrees specifically 
with Sowell on many of his arguments, saying: 
It is a major mistake to have an open fight with 
our official Black leadership. There is a legiti¬ 
macy to the constituency of the NAACP, the Urban 
League and other such organizations.21 
Wilson's book has been criticized on several points 
that are probably best expressed by Manning Marable in an 
article he wrote entitled "The Continuing Burden of Race." 
Marable first of all says that Wilson has a conceptual failure 
in his approach to Black history. There seems to Marable to 
be no conceptualization of an autonomous Black culture. Wilson 
not only implied that Blacks have developed a symbiotic rela¬ 
tionship with (white) racist, but that this dependent relation- 
22 
ship has continued even after slavery. Marable maintains 
that Wilson erred by not examining the evolutionary process of 
Black social protest, however ineffectual that protest might 
or might not have been. Wilson attacked the class interpreta¬ 
tion of Marxism while at the same time placing the greatest 
weight of his analysis on the evolution of the Black community 
as a function of the immediate class changes within the capi- 
23 
talist economy. Wilson also seemed to define class almost 
exclusively in terms of income levels with no allowances or 
adjustments to inflationary rates. Lastly, Wilson placed 
^Ibid. , p. 54 . 
22 
Wilson, pp. 35-36. 
2 3 
Manning Marable, "The Continuing Burden of Race," 
Radical America, Vol. 15, Nos. 1 and 2 (Soring 1981), pp. 
68-69. 
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perhaps too much weight on the Black middle class without 
acknowledging how small that class is in the Black community 
and how little impact Black businessmen have in the economic 
marketplace. ^ 
In an article entitled "The Political Economy of Race: 
Reflections on The Declining Significance of Race," Wilson 
seemed to moderate his stance on race. He said that the move¬ 
ment of educated Blacks into professional and managerial posi¬ 
tions are occurring at the same time that labor-market expe¬ 
riences of poor Blacks are deteriorating. He sees the problem 
not only as racial but structural barriers to decent jobs, and 
sees the history of discrimination and oppression as casual 
factors in the creation of this phenomenon of an underclass. 
Wilson says that one of the reasons for the sometimes negative 
reaction to his thesis is that some people misunderstood and/or 
ignored the word "declining," by which he meant to convey the 
point that there was a changing impact of race on the economic 
structure. He maintains that the most important arguments in 
his book concerned the deteriorating conditions of the Black 
25 
poor. He takes note of the fact that other Black writers 
have also explained racial problems as he has. For instance, 
in a 1962 article in Crisis magazine, Herbert Hill was concerned 
about the effect of automation on the unskilled and semi-skilled 
“^Ibid., p. 70. 
25 
William Julius Wilson, "The Political Economy of Race: 
Reflections of The Declining Significance of Race," The Black 
Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, University of Pennsylvania edition, 
pp. 7-14. 
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jobs in which Blacks were heavily concentrated. Kenneth Clark 
in 1967 wrote a paper entitled "The Present Dilemma of the 
Negro" in which he said that the masses of Blacks were aware 
of the fact that civil rights victories benefited a small per¬ 
centage of middle class Blacks while their own predicament 
worsened. Vivian Henderson, Black economist and former presi¬ 
dent of Clark College said in 1974 that even if all racial 
prejudices and discrimination were erased immediately the ills 
brought on by the process of economic class distinction and 
26 
economic depression would still remain. 
While Wilson sees the rapid rise in Black college at¬ 
tendance as having enormous implications for the growth of the 
Black middle class, Charles V. Willie, Professor of Education 
and Urban Studies at The Harvard School of Education, maintains 
that : 
When Blacks are kept out of suburban areas by 'snob¬ 
zoning' laws that are often disguises for racial 
discrimination, their opportunities for the educa¬ 
tional opportunities necessary for moving up are 
significantly curtailed.27 
Kenneth Clark said that Wilson's analysis is wishful and pre¬ 
mature optimism because race is still the dominant factor in 
2 8 
determining the chances for Blacks. 
Black conservative philosophers in the 1980's are the 
darlings of the Republican Party. This acceptance by the Re¬ 










precarious position but also their vulnerability. The accep¬ 
tance is a deviation from the siutation which Harold Cruse 
described when he said that Black intellectuals were relegated 
to the Black community and were less able than other intellec- 
29 
tuais to command positions of decision and control. The 
present-day philosophers are also unique because they defend a 
privileged class without actually being a legitimate component 
of that class. Many of them, to the contrary, fought their way 
from slums and ghettos to reach the positions which they have. 
They now advocate that Blacks have made it in America and cor¬ 
rective programs regarding discrimination should be dismantled 
because the folk who have not made it somehow are personally 
to blame. This is a classic case of blaming the victim for the 
crime. 
Victim blaming as an ideology attributes the defects 
and inadequacy of the victims to the malignant nature of 
poverty, injustice, slum life, and racial difficulties. The 
stigma of these malignancies mark the victim. Blaming the 
victim justifies a perverse form of social action designed to 
30 
change not society but the victim. Black noeconservatives 
are therefore not unlike their white counterparts in victim 
blaming. For example, Edward C. Banfield in The Unheavenly 
City has many instances of victim blaming. He blamed victims 
29 Cruse, "Role of the Negro Intellectual-Survey of the 
Dialogue Deferred," pp. 451-475. 
3 0 
William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1971), pp. 7-8. 
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of the ghetto for the ghetto environment by saying "... they 
cared little or nothing for lawns and had no objections to 
31 
broken bottles." Banfield divided Blacks into four classes 
(1) the upper class, which is future oriented and most like 
white people; (2) the middle class, who are interested in 
getting ahead personally; (3) the working class, who live for 
the present and care nothing for world affairs; and (4) the 
lower class, who live from moment to moment, lack self-discip 
line and have no group loyalty. Not surprisingly, Banfield 
estimated that 58 percent of all Blacks were lower class, 37 
percent working class, 4 percent middle class, and only 1 per 
32 
cent upper class. The implication is that the reason why 
Blacks are unsuccessful is because they do not strive to be 
successful. Many Black conservative philosophers feel very 
comfortable with this statement. Banfield goes even further 
by saying: 
The increasing isolation of the lower class is a 
problem, to be sure, but it is hard to see what 
can be done about it. The upper classes will 
continue to want to separate themselves physically 
from the lower, and in a free country they probably 
cannot be prevented from doing so.33 
Ghetto dwellers are thus summarily blamed for the deplorable 
conditions of the ghetto and characterizations of laziness, 
slothfulness, and lack of motivation seem not to be too far 
31 
Edward C. Banfield, The Heavenly City (New York: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1970), p. 123. 
32 
Ibid., P* 266. 
33_. . , Ibid., P- 85. 
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in the background. 
Victim blaming is not an unusual component of Black 
philosophers' thinking because they appear to exhibit feelings 
of hatred for their race. In Ethnic America, Sowell praises 
every ethnic group except Blacks, and to a minor degree, Mexicans 
and Puerto Ricans. These three ethnic groups also happen to be 
on the bottom of every indice Sowell uses in terms of economic 
stability and almost any other factor used to measure accom¬ 
plishments and other positive characteristics of the seven 
34 
ethnic groups examined. Sowell discounts the idea of there 
being anything resembling Black culture by saying that after 
200 years of slavery the language and culture faded away and 
Blacks became cultural and biological products of the new 
world.^ This notion should be juxtaposed with his assertions 
that the Germans brought to America their beer making ability, 
and Jews their innate superiority in the garment industry, the 
Irish their ability to form coalitions and succeed in politics, 
and the Japanese their superiority in the hard sciences. 
Sowell characterized the experience of slavery in the 
United States as less brutal than in other countries and the 
living conditions as ample even if low in quality. The slave 
owners are characterized by him as more than kind to their 
slaves because they considered them investments. Despite this 
"excellent" treatment the slaves developed foot-dragging, work- 
34 
Sowell, Ethnic America, pp. 247-251. 
35 
Ibid., p. 183. 
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evading patterns that remained a cultural legacy long after 
3 6 
slavery disappeared. Other traits which Sowell maintains 
did not disappear with emancipation were lack of initiatives, 
half done work, and unpredictable absenteeism. Sowell ends 
his analysis of "Americans from Africa" by reproaching American 
Blacks freed via emancipation as opposed to other classes of 
Blacks who are distinct for much more positive reasons-such 
as being the "first" of their race to reach some achievement. 
This distinction goes to descendants of elite families, West 
37 Indian Blacks, and free persons of color. 
Sowell's dialectics, therefore, are not unlike his white 
counterparts. Frederick Jackson Turner, a white American his¬ 
torian wrote in 1906 that: 
It would seem that Northern men, in their conclusion 
that the slave was unhappy, tended to attribute to 
him their own feelings and reactions to the conditions 
under which he lives. In general, he was sufficiently 
fed, with a course diet, adequately clothed, but poorly 
housed (though not to such a degree as to produce dis¬ 
content in the slave's mind), and allowed opportunity 
for expressing the natural joyousness of the African 
temperament; and hardship was felt rather by indivi¬ 
duals than by the mass slaves. 
This statement seems to be almost in total agreement with 
Sowell's thoughts seventy-five years later. 
Of course Black conservative politicians also engage 
in the practice of blaming the victim for the crime. One of 
36 
Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
37Ibid., pp. 199-200, 216-224. 
3 8 
Frederick Jackson Turner, The United States 1830-1850; 
The Nation and its Sections (New York: Holt, 1935), pp. 149, 209. 
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their members demeaned his sister in an interview in a popular 
weekly magazine for her welfare dependency without asking 
fundamental questions about the lack of success of welfare 
programs themselves. Clarence Thomas, Aide to Senator John 
Danforth (R-Mo.) is opposed to affirmative action because he 
believes it stigmatizes people who have made it on their own, 
i.e., people like him. He said that he always resented the 
fact that his Yale Law School classmates (his "peers") assumed 
39 
he had been admitted under lowered standards. He cared then 
what his peers thought as he does now. In his work with Sena¬ 
tor Danforth he refuses to have any input into policy formula¬ 
tions which deal specifically with Blacks. He explains this 
by saying dealing specifically with Black issues would under¬ 
mine his effectiveness and would convince his associates that 
the only reason he was hired was to work on Black-oriented 
40 
issues. Not only does this line of reasoning seem to be a 
denial of self but it also exhibits a semblance of self pre¬ 
servation in holding and maintaining a position close to those 
in power. 
The possible danger in the positions taken by the 
Black conservative philosophers is not that their inquiry is 
totally off target; indeed, many times they raise questions 
of legitimate concern. The danger is that they seem to want 
to forget who they are as well as the factual account of their 
39 
Jerrold K. Footlick, Gerald C. Lubenow, Diane 
Weathers, James Doyle, Howard Fineman, and Vern E. Smith, "The 
Black Conservatives," Newsweek, March 9, 1981, p. 31. 
40Ibid. 
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own historical genesis. They become defenders of a philosophy 
which has never recognized the Black experience as anything 
but a negative pathology. Paul Baran would call these philoso¬ 
phers intellect workers, working with their mind rather than 
their muscle. They become spokesmen for the system. Intellect 
workers, in Baran's view, pretend to exhibit an ethical neu¬ 
trality where means are separated from ends-even though their 
41 
ideas might very well be utilized in policy formation. Black 
conservative political thinkers articulate the goals and objec¬ 
tives of normal science (that science where past scientific 
achievement supplies the foundation for future practice). Any 
empirical work executed is used to articulate the accepted 
paradigm and there seems never to be questions raised regarding 
42 
paradigm destruction. Many of the personalities included in 
this study were educated at white institutions and therefore 
were indoctrinated with the worldview of those institutions. 
There are, after all, historical reasons for the existence of 
predominantly Black colleges and universities, and the world¬ 
view of Black institutions are presumably discordant from that 
of predominantly white institutions. 
Samuel DuBois Cook says that justice has not been done 
to the Black experience by those in the disciplines who are 
41 
Paul Baran, "The Commitment of the Intellectual," 
contained in A Collective Portrait (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1965). 
42 
From Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific 
Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). This 
work illustrates how difficult it is for those in any discip¬ 
line to be innovative and different, to say nothing of being 
truthful. 
105 
being discussed in this paper. Instead, he says, the discip¬ 
lines have been guided by categories, perceptions, interpreta¬ 
tions, and applications which do not fully reflect the facts. 
These types of frameworks are vehicles of racism because of 
43 
the matter of conceptualization and application. The world¬ 
view would therefore never be able to coexist peacefully with 
the worldview of the majority of Black folk. Mack Jones has 
an interesting discussion on this topic which says that all 
social science inquiry is based on certain assumptions idiosyn¬ 
cratic to the people being served and to the extent that two 
people find themselves in adversary positions their respective 
social science can hardly be complimentary because all social 
44 
science is parochial. Thus, when Blacks are educated at 
white institutions they run the risks of being socialized into 
accepting the white experience as being universal. Education 
in this instance can be said to lead to acceptance of a particu 
lar way of thinking. 
The socialization process is also a part of this frame 
work. Black political conservatives and conservative philoso¬ 
phers are not dissimilar from the dominant group of conserva¬ 
tives. Black neoconservatives are in fact almost identical 
to their white counterparts. They are similarly educated in 
their craft and become primarily interested in the transmission 
43 
Samuel Cook, p. xxiv. Cook was speaking particu¬ 
larly of the political science discipline but could be argu¬ 





of ideas. Literary political journals serve as a sanctioning 
of their ideas. Their articles will be seen in such journals 
as Commentary, Policy Review, Moral Majority Report, and Public 
Interest. They will also be undergirded by such institutions 
as The Hoover Institution, Reader's Digest, the Heritage 
Foundation, The American Enterprise Institute, and the Institu¬ 
tion for Contemporary Studies. 
Because Black conservative philosophers are all too 
willing to transmit the conservative doctrine, they do not seem 
to have much difficulty getting their work published in book 
form by right wing publishing houses. It is therefore not 
unusual to see a publishing company such as Basic Books publish 
a book by Sowell which has a favorable review on the dust jac¬ 
ket by a white neoconservative such as Irving Kristol. It is 
also not unusual to see a Thomas Sowell or a Walter Williams 
make an appearance on The Phil Donahue television show because 
their message is geared to the type of audience that is at¬ 
tracted to a show such as Donahue's. 
The audience of the Black philosophers-up to this 
point at least-seems not to be the masses of people whose 
lives are continually affected by discriminatory practices, 
budget cuts, and the elimination of the minimum wage. These 
Black philosophers never subscribed to such issues as busing 
to achieve racial integration or affirmative action in the 
first place and have had little connection with organized 
politics. Bernard Anderson, economist at the University of 
Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business, says that an 
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important component of their interest group following will 
prove to be the new class of Black business professionals, 
i.e., those who are trained in the best business schools and 
who are working in Fortune 500 companies. These are people 
who until now have felt self-conscious about their corporate 
45 
success and their corporate values. 
In the process of articulating the virtues of limited 
government, free market enterprise, and individual reliance, 
they have almost automatically gained an audience with the 
Republican Party. When Vernon Jordan, Benjamin Hooks, and 
other liberal Black leaders had a meeting with Ronald Reagan 
immediately after his election victory, Sowell, Williams, and 
other Black conservatives organized a Black Alternatives Con¬ 
ference in San Francisco where Edward Meese, III, counselor to 
the President and Martin Anderson, White House Domestic Adviser, 
were in attendance. In March of 1981 a similar meeting took 
place and the desire then was to create a national mass member¬ 
ship organization to counter-balance those such as the NAACP 
46 
and the Urban League. Usually, though, Black conservative 
philosophers only occasionally come together and instead work 
only towards their separate ends. There seems to be no net¬ 
work among them. Individualism is the rule rather than the 
exception. Parker and his Lincoln Institute independently pro¬ 
duced a report for the Reagan transition team charging EEOC 
with being overzealous. The report also opposed quotas for 
45 Daniels, p. 23. 
46 
Footlick et al, p. 29. 
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minorities and women. Sowell works mainly out of the Hoover 
Institution and reportedly refused a Cabinet post offered him 
48 
by Ronald Reagan. 
Walter Williams uses his highly visible position at 
George Mason University as a forum for presenting his ideas. 
He is very vocal in his beliefs and his primary theme is that 
the Federal government and its interventionist programs have 
indirectly kept Blacks in a state of dependency. He says that 
welfare programs have encouraged illegitimacy by making it 
cheap to have babies. He admits that in the 1980's color does 
make a difference but he is not willing to concede that it is 
the most important factor. He mimics Sowell in saying that all 
minorities who came to this country initially had to struggle 
against adversity-but he breaks away from Sowell's analysis by 
saying that in urban areas the market was closed to Blacks by 
the time they arrived. His solution to the dilemma is to lower 
the minimum wage because he says employers are not going to hire 
inexperienced workers (many of whom are Black, he says) and pay 
the minimum wage because these inexperienced workers cannot pro- 
49 
duce that dollar amount in goods and services. Williams of 
late has had a regular column in the organ of the Moral Majority, 
The Moral Majority Report, and freely expounds on these and 
47 Julia Malone, "Black Conservatives Like 'Jay' Parker 
Step into Reagan Limelight," The Christian Science Monitor. 
(February 11, 1981). 
48 






William Wilson agrees with these Black conservative 
philosophers on a few issues but certainly not all. He is anti¬ 
affirmative action because he says it has not done it.'s job. 
He says that race is a declining component in understanding the 
circumstances of Black Americans and is thus critical of the 
liberal Black elite for the way they define and/or obscure 
class differences.^ Wilson disagrees with Williams and others 
on lowering the minimum wage because he does not see the prob¬ 
lem as merely being the availability of jobs in low wage indus¬ 
tries. Instead, the availability of jobs that pay decent wages 
and provide opportunities for advancement should be sought, he 
feels. Wilson is convinced that recent developments associated 
with advanced capitalism are responsible for the so-called 
underclass as well as the ghettos which warehouse them.^ On 
this point he certainly differs from many of the conservative 
philosophers because he does not resort to victim-blaming and 
does not attempt a class analysis of the Black predicament. 
The Black conservative philosophers do agree on certain 
issues, however. They share a common belief in the failure of 
social programs begun in the 1960's, are generally anti-affirma¬ 
tive action, anti-busing, favor mass government deregulation, 
and believe private initiative has been checked as a result of 
the liberal penchant for regulation. They agree with many right 
^Friedman, p. 52. 
51 
William Wilson's "Reflections," p. 18. 
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wingers on these positions and often find themselves associated 
with people who could politely be termed their ideological 
opposites. This is quite similar to Marcus Garvey's position 
when he and Theodore G. Bilbo (staunch Mississippi segrega- 
52 tionist and racist) formed an alliance of sorts. 
Murray Friedman in 1980 produced a favorable review of 
the new Black intellectuals (Wilson, Sowell, and Williams) and 
seemed almost gleeful at the prospect of them toppling the 
traditional Civil Rights leaders. In 1969 he said that the 
Kerner Report was responsible for provoking a white backlash. 
He also maintained that whites were not racist when they pro¬ 
tected their economic and social interests by barring Blacks 
from jobs, housing, education, and other aspects of upward 
, .,.. 53 mooility. 
Black conservative philosophers use their unique posi¬ 
tion of being both Black and conservative to transmit some 
rather negative opinions about Black people that might be in¬ 
terpreted as racist if said by their white counterparts. Thomas 
Sowell, again, the most prolific of the philosophers, devotes 
much of his time writing about the condition of Black students. 
5 2 They were linked via Bilbo's Greater Liberia Act 
which he introduced in the U.S. Senate in 1939. Garvey said 
then that "The Senator's desire for carrying out the purpose 
of his bill may not be as idealistic as Negroes may want but 
that is not the point to be considered." See Tony Martin's 
Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of 
Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), pp. 344-355. 
53 Murray Friedman, "Is White Racism the Problem?", 
Commentary (January 1969), pp. 61-65. 
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In a word he considers the condition bad. In a 1974 Daedalus 
article entitled "The Plight of Black Students in the United 
States" he said that Black students on the whole were academi¬ 
cally unprepared to meet the standards of the leading (white) 
colleges and universities. He further said that there is a 
widespread mismatching of individuals with institutions. In¬ 
stead of distributing Black students to schools whose standards 
they have already met, special programs are designed to get 
them into prestige schools. Sowell then asserts that Black 
high school students do less than their best in order to obtain 
scholarships to prestige schools at lower standards which they 
could have presumably obtained anyway (sans scholarship) if they 
had really applied themselves. Sowell also blames Black stu¬ 
dents for rises in school costs because of the remedial pro¬ 
grams which have to be set up for them as well as the danger 
involved in them becoming violent and disruptive. There is a 
double standard in grading, credit given for courses with 
little content, and 'incomplètes' given for failing work, ac- 
54 
cording to Sowell. 
Sowell is also not convinced that Black students relate 
better to Black teachers, or if there is even any intellectual 
relevancy in being able to relate to a teacher. He says that 
there are relatively few trained Black scholars and it would 
take time to lift them from their level of inferiority. Lastly, 
he castigates Black schools as not being of high quality (none, 
^Thomas Sowell, "The Plight of Black Students in the 
United States," Daedalus (Spring 1974), pp. 179-196. 
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he says, has a department ranking among the leading depart¬ 
ments in twenty-nine fields, none has a student body whose 
college board scores are within 100 points of any Ivy League 
school, and their libraries are totally inadequate). In fact, 
he raises the question of whether (or why) institutions which 
are predominantly Black should even continue to exist, since 
55 more and more Black students are opting for white schools. 
Sowell has an even less positive assessment of eight 
schools (which were chosen from a list prepared by Horace Bond 
which showed those Black high schools whose alumni included the 
most doctorate degrees from 1957 to 1962) he found little good 
news. Of the eight schools which he examined, only four re¬ 
ceived his seal of approval. Those schools which he determined 
had declined had done so because the human motivational re¬ 
sources were missing, discipline had become a problem, and the 
elements of elitism had disappeared and admission to these so- 
called good schools had become open to everyone.^ 
Sowell places a great deal of weight on test scores as 
they relate to ranking and recognition in the larger white 
world. In most of his analyses considerable weight is also 
placed on those Blacks whom he labels "free persons of color." 
These Blacks, he maintains, were years ahead of the Blacks who 
were slaves in their acculturation to the American society and 
it is their descendants who became the Black leaders and the 
■^Thomas Sowell, "Patterns of Black Excellence," 
Public Interest (Spring 1976), pp. 26-58. 
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Black firsts: the first Black federal judge, the first 
Black cabinet member, the first Black to receive a Ph.D. 
57 
in the twentieth century. His position in this regard 
is not unlike the position taken by many reactionary whites 
who have historically judged a Black person's intelligence 
by how much white blood was present. Sowell has been ac¬ 
cused by many as indulging in pigment politics as well as 
being racist in his own way. 
Finally, then, Black conservative philosophers have 
dispelled the idea that Black thinkers are of one mind. They 
have voiced very serious differences in philosophy. They have 
not tied themselves to the Democratic Party as the traditional 
Black status group has. Alex Willingham has concluded that 
the traditional Black status group would have no prominence at 
all if it were not for politics, so they have continually 
taken it upon themselves to articulate a theory that affirms 
the adjustments made to social institutions by the general 
. , • 58 public. 
The Black philosophical conservatives have articulated 
no such theories and are not tied to either the liberals or 
the Democrats. The fear expressed by many is that perhaps 
they have abandoned the liberals too soon. They need to be¬ 
come wary of becoming the resident Black spokesmen for the 
Republican Party and Republican administration. They also 
57 
Sowell, Ethnic America, pp. 194-196. 
5 8 Alex Willingham, "Ideology and Politics: Their 
Status in Afro-American Social Theory," Endarch (Spring 
1975), pp. 4-25. 
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should question their own particular motives and ask them¬ 
selves whether they are becoming the other side of the 
liberal coin. They should further ask the question of 
whether they are becoming as dependent on conservative organs 
and organizations as liberal Blacks are on liberal organiza¬ 
tions. Some Black conservatives do seem to be asking them¬ 
selves these very serious questions. Clarence Thomas said, 
for instance, 
My understanding is that Ronald Reagan and his 
administration is committed to enforcing the anti- 
discrimination laws. But, oh God, I sure hope 
they don't blow it. Because some of us would 
really have to eat crow, man—and without the 
ketchup. 
Civil Rights 
Many Blacks in America see the 1980's as a decade of 
an increasing resurgence of racist attitudes. Benjamin L. 
Hooks, executive director of the NAACP, was quoted as saying 
the reaction of the Black community to Ronald Reagan's presi¬ 
dential election win was near hysteria. Reagan himself was 
cognizant of this ambivalence, for in August of 1980 in a 
speech to the National Urban League he said: 
For too many people, conservative has come to mean 
anti-poor, anti-Black, and anti-disadvantaged. 
Perhaps some of you wonder whether a conservative 
really feels sympathy and compassion for the victims 
of social and economic misfortune ....60 
Perhaps the greatest threats that Blacks feel is the 
~^Footlick et al, p. 33. 
6 0 "Reagan, Black Leaders, and Black Voters," National 
Review (August 22, 1980), p. 1000. 
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possible demise of some of the more stringent sections of 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well as the elimination of 
affirmative action programs. William B. Reynolds, assistant 
attorney general in charge of the Justice Department's civil 
rights division told a House subcommittee in September of 
1981 that job discrimination would be handled on a case-by¬ 
case basis under the Reagan administration. He said further 
that the Reagan administration: 
... would no longer insist upon or ... support the 
use of quotas or any other numerical or statistical 
formulae designed to provide to non-victims of dis¬ 
crimination preferential treatment based on race, 
sex, national origin or religion.61 
This position necessarily makes many Blacks feel un¬ 
comfortable about their future. The conditions of the 1980's 
are not so different from those of 1867, when the Ku Klux 
Klan was formed into an alliance in Nashville, Tennessee of 
those who believed in white supremacy. David Dukes, one of 
the present-day leaders of the KKK, is college educated and 
does not resort to the overtly racist barbs of many of his 
predecessors. He does not need to because the Klan and its 
views seem to have been legitimized throughout the nation. 
The Supreme Court decisions of The University of California 
Regents v. Bakke (438 U.S. 265) and United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber (443 U.S. 193) illustrate that the tide has 
turned away from affirmative action towards something a little 
more sinister. This is similar to the period in United States 
^"Black Congressmen Blast New Approach to Fair 
Employment," The Atlanta Journal, September 24, 1981, p. 9A. 
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history when the Compromise of 1877 summarily ended Recon¬ 
struction in the South as well as the protection given to 
Black citizens by federal troops. This period also marked 
the beginning of Southern United States senators and repre¬ 
sentatives maintenance of a longevity unequaled by any other 
group of Congressmen. As a result, many southern states now 
possess chairmanships of many important committees which 
affect Blacks not only economically but in other respects as 
i i 62 well. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is particularly vul¬ 
nerable. It was initiated to try to combat voter abuses 
directed mainly at Blacks and had three provisions: (1) it 
banned all poll tax; (2) it outlawed literacy tests; and (3) 
it required certain jurisdictions to submit any changes 
regarding voting to a special clearance committee of the Jus¬ 
tice Department. The VRA of 1965 was initially directed at 
seven states-Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, and Georgia. It was later ex¬ 
tended to include Texas, Arizona, Alaska, California, and New 
Mexico. The VRA of 1965 is threatened on two fronts in the 
1980's. ' First, the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in 
the City of Mobile v. Bolden case (100 S. Ct. 1490) ruled that 
intent to discriminate must be proven and this turns out to be 
an almost impossible task at times. Past deeds can no longer 
be a deciding consideration. The second threat comes from 
ft ? Senator Strom Thurmond, for example, is chairman of 
the powerful Senate Judiciary Committee, which has the last 
word on the extention of the Voting Rights Act. 
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Senator Strom Thurmond, who as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee wields considerable weight. His committee will con¬ 
duct the hearing on the extension of the Voting Rights Act. 
Thurmond has already publicly stated that the VRA singles out 
the South, even though the two previous extensions banned liter¬ 
acy tests nationwide and Section 5 of the extensions was expanded 
6 3 
to include twenty-four states. 
Reaganomics and New Federalism 
Victor Perlo said in 1975 that economic discrimination 
64 
against Blacks was the nation's number one economic problem, 
and statistics of the 1980's do not show a vast improvement. 
Early in Ronald Reagan's administration there was a turn away 
from Keynesian economics to supply side economics. The supply 
side economic theory has been explained by George Gilder (who 
6 3 JFrom an insightful paper by Laughlin McDonald, Direc¬ 
tor of the Southern Regional Office of ACLU. The paper is 
entitled "Voting Rights on the Chopping Black" and traces the 
discriminatory practices used in Edgefield, South Carolina from 
the 1880's and the days of B. R. "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman to the 
present days of Strom Thurmond. Jesse Helms also proved a less 
formidable foe in the battle over the extension of the The 1965 
Voting Rights Act. He, along with a few other conservative 
senators, attempted to stall the vote on extension via a fili¬ 
buster. They talked for five days, but eventually had to admit 
that with seventy-eight senators sponsoring the measure, fili¬ 
bustering could do little more than prolong the inevitable. 
Therefore, in June of 1982 the Senate passed the legislation 85 
to 8. The House had already passed the bill in October 1981, 
so little remained to be done other than President Reagan sign¬ 
ing the extension into law. The extension perhaps had an un¬ 
likely friend in Republican Robert Dole of Kansas. He fashioned 
a compromise whereby judges must weigh the totality of circum¬ 
stances, which would include the past history of discrimination. 
64 
Perlo, p. 3. 
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is sometimes considered a neoconservative) in his book Wealth 
6 5 
and Poverty, which is a Basic Book. In it Gilder says optimis¬ 
tically that personal tax cuts now will lead to the stimulation 
of new economic growth later. Gilder also proposes that welfare 
programs be made unattractive in order to make families stick 
together and do more for themselves. 
Ronald Reagan has certainly done everything that he could 
to make social programs unattractive to those who have come to 
depend on them for their survival. His whole theory of supply 
side economics is based on the premise that incentives for busi¬ 
ness will expand production, and that people should invest as a 
way of reaching prosperity without high inflation. Reagan has 
additionally proposed an economic program which has been labeled 
New Federalism. Reagan's idea of New Federalism involves the 
transfer of approximately forty federally funded programs to 
state and local governments extending over a period until 1991. 
This transfer is in return for the Federal government completely 
taking over the financing of the Medicaid program. The Federal 
government would assist the states through a trust fund of about 
$28 billion a year. The fund would come from Federal excise 
taxes from gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol as well as the oil 
windfall tax revenue. Many of the traditional Civil Rights 
spokesmen as well as some non-traditional spokesmen are firmly 
opposed to some of the proposed cuts in the Federal budget. The 
6 5 
George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic 
Books, 1981). 
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Reverend Ralph D. Abernathy has said numerous times that the 
budgets which have been proposed are simply an attempt to 
balance the budget on the backs of the poor. The cuts are 
spread among social programs such as food stamps, aid to fami¬ 
lies with dependent children, public housing assistance, and 
medicaid. While most people on welfare are white and most 
Blacks are not on welfare, the 1980 Census figures seem to show 
that Blacks make up a third of those who receive food stamps, 
medicaid, and public housing assistance. 
The Reverend Jesse Jackson is convinced that there is 
an element of racism in the budget cuts. An examination of the 
Census records from Dwight Eisenhower'a administration until 
the 1980's show that income between Black and white is just as 
far apart now as it was then. In 1953 the median income of 
Black families was 56 percent that of whites. Between 1964 and 
1969 that figure rose to 63 percent, but figures now show that 
it is about 56 percent.^ 
State Rep. David Scott (Dem.-Atlanta) says that Reagan 
can be so calm about the proposed budget cuts because he only 
6 7 
sees them as affecting Blacks. A major component of Reagan's 
economic theory of supply side economics is that the private 
sector will take up the slack of some of the public programs. 
^David E. Rosenbaum, "Blacks Charge Cuts will Widen 
Gap in Income," The New York Times, June 2, 1981. 
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Joe Brown, "Rep. Scott Says Reagan Cuts Ignore 
Social Reality," The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution, 
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This notion has been disproved as early as the 1930 Depression 
Era when the Federal government was forced to get involved in 
the funding of programs because the private sector could not 
and would not support the nation's poor. Carl Rowan in July 
of 1981 cited a study financed by private foundations and the 
U.S. Department of Labor which showed that private businesses 
were reluctant to hire low income minorities even when salaries 
were subsidized.^ Perlo says that economic discrimination 
takes place mainly at the place of employment and control of 
employment is in the hands of the capitalists. He cites several 
companies in particular. AT & T, for instance, did not hire 
Blacks in anything other than janitorial positions until passage 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. After 1964 Blacks and women were 
still pushed into lower paying positions. 
Electric and gas utilities also exhibit discriminatory 
practices. A 1972 EEOC report said that of the twenty-three 
largest industries in the United States gas and utility com¬ 
panies ranked last in the employment of Blacks. One third of 
69 
such utility establishments had no Black employees. It there¬ 
fore seems highly unlikely that private businesses will take up 
where government agencies leave off in aiding the poor. 
Lastly, in an August 1981 readers survey of Black Enter¬ 
prise magazine 81.3 percent of those polled felt that Blacks 
6 8 
Carl Rowan, "Private Sector is no Panacea," The 
Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution, July 12, 1981, p. 3G. 
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would not benefit from the economic policies of the Reagan 
administration and 70.7 percent had no faith in large corpora¬ 
tions dealing fairly with Blacks without affirmative action, 
programs. The poll seems to adequately express the reserva¬ 
tions which many Blacks and most poor people have about New 
Federalism and the decade of the 1980's. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Well, the first thing I want to say is mandate my a--! 
Because it seems as though we've been convinced that 
Twenty-six percent of the registered voters 
Not even twenty-six percent of the American people 
But twenty-six percent of the registered voters 
Form a mandate or a landslide 
Twenty-one percent voted for Skippy (Jimmy Carter) 
And three or four percent voted for somebody else 
Who might have been running 
But oh yeah I remember 
In this year that we have now declared 
The year from Shogun to Reagun 
I remember what I said about Reagun-meant it 
Acted like an actor-Hollyweird 
Acted like a liberal 
Acted like General Franco when he 
Acted like Governor of California 
Then he acted like a Republican 
Then he acted like somebody was 
Gonna vote for him for President 
And now we act like twenty-six percent of the 
Registered voters is actually a mandate 
We're all actors in this I suppose 
The idea concerns the fact that this country wants no¬ 
stalgia 
They want to go back as far as they can 
Even if it's only as far as last week 
Not to face now or tomorrow 
But to face backwards 
And yesterday was the day of our cinema heroes 
Riding to the rescue at the last possible moment 
The day of the man in the white hat or the man on the 
white horse 
Or the man who always came to save America at the last 
moment 
Someone always came to save America at the last moment 
Especially in B movies 
And when America found itself having a hard time facing 
the future 
They looked for people like John Wayne 
But since John Wayne was no longer available 
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They settled for Ronald Reagun 
And it has placed us in a 
Situation that we can only look at like B movie 
.... - Gil Scott-Heron 
"B" Movie 
(from his album Reflections) 
This thesis thus ends as it began; that is, inquiring 
whether the small numbers of people who voted for Ronald Reagan 
in the 1980 Presidential election really constitute a mandate. 
This work has attempted to show that rather than being a 
majority, the constituency which helped to elect Reagan to the 
White House was instead a very pragmatic, vocal minority group 
which consisted of many single-issue groups. 
The central question, then, is whether there has been 
a drastic move to the right, or whether this perception has been 
clouded by the fact that the move has been in the making for 
the last twenty or so years and was only manifested in the elec¬ 
tions of the late 1970's and 1980 elections. The elections of 
1980 are important because the Republicans for the first time in 
twenty-six years took control of the U.S. Senate-53 to 46 (with 
Harry Byrd of Virginia being an independent), and made consider¬ 
able gains in the House-190 to the Democrats' 245. Additionally, 
four Democratic governors were defeated in the 1980 elections. 
These figures seem to illustrate that the cleavage which exist 
is manifested primarily in the struggle between the Democrat 
and Republican Parties. 
This point leads to an interesting observation. While 
the New Right strategists continually emphasize that their 
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concerns make it impossible for them to be aligned with one 
party or the other, their constituents seem to lack the sophis¬ 
tication which would enable them to identify with any party 
other than the Republican. Consequently, the cleavage which 
exists between Democrats and Republicans has seemingly been 
widened by New Right organizations. 
This paper has also attempted to reveal the perceived 
significance of the mid 1960's in America as it was manifested 
by a particular group. This period is important because it 
seemed to be a transitional period when civil rights, crime, 
urban rebellions, and positions on the Vietnam war all came 
together. Many political scientists debate whether the degree 
of change is substantive or merely cosmetic. The seventeen 
year period from 1964 to 1981 has been analyzed from the stand¬ 
point of the greater pragmatism of a certain political group, 
i.e., the New Right. While the 1980 elections seemed to herald 
a new day for those on the right, the newly installed Republican 
administration has not given New Right groups much credit for 
the inroads Republicans all across the country were able to 
make. 
Two important aspects which I have tried to analyze in 
relation to that phenomenon known as the New Right are class 
and race. I maintain that members of the New Right are more 
often than not part of the "have" group and therefore fearful of 
losing what they have obtained. I also maintain that racism 
is an important component of the New Right. Blacks and other 
minorities do not fare well in the eyes of the New Right. They 
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are seen as threats to what has been traditionally accepted as 
the norm in America. In this regard several Civil Rights advo¬ 
cates have been quoted to try to determine their reaction to 
the New Right. 
While the Civil Rights leadership has been very vocal 
in its criticism of the New Right, another group of pseudo-Black 
spokesmen (the Black neoconservatives) seem to be in total 
agreement with many of the issues that are important to the New 
Right. This position by the Black neoconservatives can almost 
be compared to that of the Jewish "kapos" who collaborated with 
the Nazis in the 1930's and 1940's. The Black neoconservatives 
are invariably those who have achieved some degree of success 
and do not in any way acknowledge that this success might have 
been obtained in spite of the fact of their Blackness. 
Black neoconservatives are not unlike their white 
counterparts. They are as much a legitimizing force of the con¬ 
servative philosophy and do not differ greatly from the doctri¬ 
naire conservative line. What is unusual about Black neoconser¬ 
vatives is that their positions are contradictory to that of a 
majority of Black citizens. Neoconservatives who are white, on 
the other hand, seem to try to synthesize their liberal and con¬ 
servative positions and also tend to legitimize the New Right 
philosophy. Many of the better known neoconservatives like 
Daniel Moynihan and Irving Kristol have more or less admitted 
that the liberal stance which they took years ago was incorrect 
and they have instead started the practice of what I term 
victim-blaming. 
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Zillah Eisenstein has also been quoted rather exten¬ 
sively for her insightful views on the anti-feminist aspect of 
the New Right. She maintains that anti-feminism was a solidify¬ 
ing force of the New Right. 
The differing opinions of the opponents of the New 
Right might perhaps explain its strength. There is no one posi¬ 
tion to zero in on. Many issues and counter-interest groups 
have individual strengths, but did not until too late see the 
strength in unity. While the New Right was able to get diver¬ 
gent groups together to be part of pragmatically successful pro¬ 
grams, Democrats and liberals were more often than not unable 
to do this. The Democrats and liberals seemed to be continually 
answering the wrong questions. 
It is my hope that I have successfully examined the New 
Right in terms of being a system which depends on smaller 
systems to succeed. I also hope that the data which I have 
gathered has illustrated two important points: (1) 27 percent 
does not constitute a mandate and (2) coalitions and alignments 
are not permanent entities and are constantly going through 
periods of change. The 1980 elections perhaps must be thought 
of in terms of a dissatisfaction with the performance of 
liberals rather than any large conservative move to the Right. 
It seems pretty clear that most people are ideologically fuzzy 
when they attempt to identify themselves as either liberal or 
conservative. Issues usually take precedent over ideology 
except in very intellectual circles. 
127 
Neoconservatives-both Black and white-have attempted 
to explain the ambiguity which exists in determining liberal 
and conservative positions. They seem especially adept at 
explaining the feelings of the so-called middle class, who 
feel that affirmative action programs and anti-discrimination 
programs work to their disadvantage. Racism, therefore, has 
been a key element of my analysis and has been examined exten¬ 
sively. It can perhaps be said that racist attitudes account 
for the cohesiveness that is displayed by the New Right, but 
the question is still open as to whether it is enough to main¬ 
tain this cohesiveness. It is apparent even now (mid-1982) 
that the purported strength of the New Right is waning as the 
Republican Party begins setting its own agenda and priorities 
separate and apart from its New Right constituency. As the 
Republican Party and Ronald Reagan go more and more on this 
independent path, the New Right is beginning to seem like the 
paper tiger that perhaps it was destined to be. 
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his first volume of The 
Age of Roosevelt, the Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933, gives 
an in-depth analysis of the years immediately preceding the 
Great Depression. In this first volume he traces the years of 
prosperity as well as the arrogance of businessmen who felt 
confident that capitalism and its trappings would never cease 
to be popular. Schlesinger also chronicles the dissatisfaction 
expressed by the majority of working people of that era. While 
in the years immediately preceding 1930 there were at least 25 
percent of the population without work or any other source of 
income, Hoover and his capitalist cronies promised prosperity 
just over the horizon. Because of such empty promises the 
Communist Party USA gained a new constituency of membership 
and/or sympathizers, the Bonus Army was able to attract upwards 
of 35,000 disgruntled veterans to Washington, D. C. into make¬ 
shift camps which were commonly called "Hoovervilles," and the 
general breakdown of authority and law and order was widely in 
evidence. Thus, when Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected to the 
Presidency in 1932 it was time for immediate action and not 
mere rhetoric. In Volume II of The Age of Roosevelt, The 
Coming of the New Deal, Schlesinger details what this action 
entailed. Many of the subsequent programs were put into effect 
during the first 100 days of Roosevelt's first term as Presi¬ 
dent. By June 15, 1933 Franklin Roosevelt and the 73rd Con¬ 
gress had passed many major pieces of legislation, among them 
1) the March 9 Emergency Banking Act, 2) the March 31 establish¬ 
ment of the Civilian Conservation Corps, 3) the May 12 estab¬ 
lishment of the Federal Emergency Relief Act, which set up a 
national relief system, 4) the May 12 establishment of the 
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, which provided for the refinancing 
of farm mortgates, 5) the May 18 Tennessee Valley Authority 
Act, which provided for the unified development of the Tennes¬ 
see Valley and which affected Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Virginia, and North Carolina, 6) the June 
13 Home Owners' Loan Act, which provided for the refinancing 
of home mortgages, 7) the June 16 National Industrial Recovery 
Act, which was the very beginning of the federal supervision 
of a $3.3 billion public works program. The NIRA was placed 
under the supervision of the National Recovery Administration 
and was perhaps the most significant of the Acts passed during 
that famous 100 day period. It was specifically designed to 
put people to work. Title I was designed to promote the 
organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action 
among trade groups, while Title II called for the establish¬ 
ment of a Public Works Administration with an appropriation 
of $3,300,000,000. Many of the programs and projects were 
later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court but were 
later adopted into similar enactments. The National Recovery 
128 
129 
Administration had many major accomplishments, among them the 
establishment of national maximum hours and minimum wages, 
abolition of child labor, the end of sweatshops, and newfound 
power placed in the hands of the consumer. As a result of 
these peices of legislation, the 1935 Social Security Act was 
passed and it became the basic social welfare legislation of 
its time and set the precedent for programs of later decades: 
Old age assistance, disability, Medicare, unemployment in¬ 
surance, public assistance, and Aid to Dependent Children. It 
remains the most comprehensive social welfare legislation 
passed so far in the United States. (Much of the information 
in this appendix is taken from Schlesinger's two volumes, both 
of which were published by The Houghton Mifflin Company, 
Boston, Massachusetts, 1957 and 1959, respectively.) 
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Amendment I We believe that, from the time of conception 
within the womb, every human being has a 
scriptural right to life upon this earth. 
(Ex. 20:13; Psa. 139:13-16) 
Amendment II We believe that every person has the right to 
pursue any and all scriptural goals that he 
or she feels are God-directed during that life 
upon this earth. (Prov. 3:5-6). 
Amendment III We believe that, apart from justified capital 
punishment, no medical or judicial process 
should be introduced that would allow the 
termination of life before its natural or 
accidential completion. (Psa. 31:15) 
Amendment IV We believe that no traitorous verbal or 
written attack upon this beloved nation advo¬ 
cating overthrow by force be permitted by any 
citizen or alien living within this country. 
(Rom. 13:1-7. 
Amendment V We believe that all students enrolled in 
public schools should have the right to 
voluntary prayer and Bible reading. (Josh. 
24:15) 
Amendment VI We believe in the right and responsibility 
to establish and administer private Christian 
schools without harassment from local, state 
of federal government. (Deut. 11:18-21) 
Amendment VII. We believe in the right to influence secular 
professions, including the fields of poli¬ 
tics, business, legal, medical, in establish¬ 
ing and maintaining moral principles of 
Scripture. (Prov. 14:34) 
Amendment VIII We believe in the right to expect our na¬ 
tional leaders to keep this country morally 
and militarily strong so that religious 
freedom and Gospel preaching might continue 
unhindered. (I Pet. 2:13-17) 
Amendment IX We believe in the right to receive moral 
support from all local, state, and federal 
agencies concerning the traditional family 
unit, a concept that enjoys both scriptural 
and historical precedence. (Gen. 2:18-25) 
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Amendment X We believe in the right of legally-approved 
religious organizations to maintain their 
tax-exempt status, this right being based 
upon the historical and scriptural concept 
of church and state separation. (Matt. 22: 
17-21) 
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